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THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE SPECIAL COURT
FOR SIERRA LEONE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
CHARLES CHERNOR JALLOH*
INTRODUCTION
On 16 January 2002, the United Nations ('UN') and the Government of Sierra
Leone ('Sierra Leone') signed an historic agreement' establishing the Special
Court for Sierra Leone ('the SCSL' or 'the Court'). The SCSL, authorised by
UN Security Council ('SC') Resolution 1315 (2000),2 was mandated under
Article 1 of its Statute to try those leaders bearing 'greatest responsibility' 3 for
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the small West African nation during a decade
of brutal conflict involving at least four armed factions.4 Uniquely, the Court is
also empowered to bring to justice those who masterminded violations of Sierra
Leonean law relating to the abuse of underage girls and the wanton destruction of
property.5 Interestingly, though alleged international crimes were documented by
human rights groups from the start of the war in March 1991, the temporal juris-
* B.A. (Guelph), LL.B., B.C.L. (McGill), M.St. International Human Rights Law with Distinc-
tion (Oxon.); of the Bar of Ontario, Canada. Mr. Jalloh previously served as Legal Advisor to
the Office of the Principal Defender, Special Court for Sierra Leone and as Legal Counsel in
the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Section, Department of Justice (Canada). He
wishes to thank Julia Osei-Tutu, Andrew Shacknove, Joseph Rikhof, Alhagi Marong and Chile
Eboe-Osuji for their useful comments. This article is a revised version of a dissertation submitted
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Master's degree at Oxford University. E-mail:
jallohc@gmail.com.
1 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establish-
ment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone (16 January 2002) <http://www.sc-sl.org/documents.
html> accessed 10 November 2006 ('UN-Sierra Leone Agreement'). Annexed to the UN-Sierra
Leone Agreement was the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone ('SCSL Statute').
2 UN Doc S/RES/1315 (2000).
3 Article 1(1) of the SCSL Statute and Article 1(1) of the UN-Sierra Leone Agreement. The idea
that international criminal courts should be focusing on prosecuting a limited group of individ-
uals was first introduced by the SCSL Statute. The idea has since been adopted and deployed to
frame the work of other international criminal tribunals.
4 Because the Sierra Leone conflict had not ended when the parties were negotiating the establish-
ment of the SCSL, the end date for temporal jurisdiction was not specified. Sierra Leone officially
declared the war over on 18 January 2002. Thus, that date informally represents the cut-off point
of the Court's temporal jurisdiction.
5 The Court's personal jurisdiction excluded any peacekeepers that may have committed interna-
tional crimes during the Sierra Leonean conflict, despite the allegation that some peacekeepers
may have committed international crimes.
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diction6 of the SCSL was limited - apparently because of concerns about funding
and overburdening the time-limited tribunal with cases - to crimes within Sierra
Leone between 30 November 1996 and about 18 January 2002.'
The creation of the SCSL, which is currently trying ten persons,' including
former Liberian President Charles Taylor who has now become one of the most
high profile accused before an international criminal court, is arguably the most
important development in international criminal law since the adoption in July
1998 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ('Rome Statute').9
This importance derives from the SCSL's status as the first independent treaty-
based international criminal tribunal with a mixed jurisdiction ratione materiae
(subject-matter jurisdiction) and composition. Indeed, while so-called 'mixed'
or 'hybrid" courts were set up by the UN in East Timor, Kosovo, Bosnia, and
more recently Cambodia in conjunction with that country's government, those
tribunals were grafted on to the institutions and structures of those countries'
respective legal systems. However, though it exhibits some national features, the
SCSL is independent of Sierra Leonean courts and possesses the distinct legal
personality of an international organisation that permits it to operate in the sphere
of international law.
Significantly, some six decades after the establishment of the Nuremberg"
and Tokyo 2 Tribunals, and within a decade of the creation of the ad hoc Inter-
national Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 3 and Rwanda" ('ICTY'
and 'ICTR' respectively), the SCSL presents the most advanced 'nationalised'
6 See Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone, UN Doc S/2000/915 (4 October 2000), paras. 22-27 ['UNSG Report on SCSL Establish-
ment'].
7 UNSG Report on SCSL Establishment, supra note 6 at para. 27.
8 Besides the Taylor case, there are currently 3 joint trials before the SCSL. The nine accused
are former members of the main warring parties: the Revolutionary United Front (Issa Sesay,
Morris Kallon, Augustine Gbao), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Alex Brima, Santigie
Kanu, Ibrahim Kamara) and the Civil Defence Forces (Samuel Norman, Moinina Fofana, Allieu
Kondewa). The indictment of JP Koroma still stands though he is not, as of writing, in the
custody of the SCSL. The indictments of Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie were withdrawn
following their confirmed deaths.
9 (Adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3.
10 In Part III, I consider the merits of the phraseology used to describe the Court and similar
criminal tribunals. Here, I prefer 'nationalised international criminal court'. Cf L.A. Dickinson,
'The Promise of Hybrid Courts', 97(2) American Journal of International Law (2003) 295-310
at 295.
11 In 1945, the allies set up a tribunal to try former senior Nazi officials. See Agreement by United
Kingdom, United States of America, France and U.S.S.R for the Prosecution and Punishment of
the Major War Criminals of the European Axis and Charter of the International Military Tribunal
(signed 8 August 1945) 82 UNTS 279.
12 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo (19 January 1946, as
amended, 26 April 1946) TIAS 1585.
13 See UN Doc S/Res/827 (1993) and UN Doc S/Res/808 (1993) and the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991 (25
May 1993) 32 ILM 1192.
14 UN Doc S/Res/955 (1994) and Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (8
November 1994) 32 ILM 1602.
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international tribunal model to hold accountable the perpetrators of egregious
crimes in situations where, for various reasons, 5 the sole use of pure domestic
or pure international justice mechanisms is deemed to be inadequate or ineffec-
tive. Though it could be said to represent a new breed of international criminal
court, taking an historic view, the Court in many ways exemplifies the evolution
of international rule of law which reached its watershed at Nuremberg after World
War II but laid dormant until the SC established the ICTY and ICTR in the early
1990s.
Given that the ICTY and ICTR were the first truly international criminal tribu-
nals to be ever established, there has been much scholarly commentary on their
pioneering work, most of which focuses on their jurisprudential contributions
to the advancement of the concept of individual criminal responsibility at the
international level and on the elaboration of the substantive content of the various
crimes within their jurisdiction, especially genocide, crimes against humanity and
war crimes. 6
In stark contrast, since the SCSL was established in January 2002, fewer
scholarly works have systematically studied that tribunal to discern whether it
has made, or is making, any meaningful addition to international law. While
there now appears to be an exponential growth in literature 7 on the Court, until
recently the bulk of the commentary focused on the SCSL's hybridity compared
to the ICTY and ICTR and its possibilities of serving as a much cheaper model
for bringing justice to diverse post-conflict situations. Even fewer scholars have
15 For example, where the legal system is weak or has collapsed or the judiciary is unable to
dispense justice because of civil strife or ethnic and religious hatred. See A. Cassese, The Role of
Internationalized Courts and Tribunals in the Fight Against International Criminality, in Cesare
P.R. Romano et. al. (eds), Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone East Timor, Kosovo,
and Cambodia, Oxford University Press (2004) 10.
16 For recent works comprehensively addressing the issues, see W.A. Schabas, The UN Inter-
national Criminal Tribunals: The former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, Cambridge
University Press (2006); G. Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals, Oxford
University Press (2005); L.J. van den Herik, The Contribution of the Rwanda Tribunal to the
Development of International Law, Martinus Nijhoff (2005) and E. Mose, 'Main Achievements
of the ICTR', 3(4) Journal of International Criminal Justice (2005) 920.
17 See, for example, M. Frulli, 'The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Some Preliminary Comments',
11(4) European Journal of International Law (2000) 857; R. Cryer, 'A Special Court for Sierra
Leone?', 50(2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2000) 435; S. Linton, 'Cambodia,
East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice',. 12(2) Criminal Law Forum
(2001) 185; N. Fritz and A. Smith, 'Current Apathy for Coming Anarchy: Building the Special
Court for Sierra Leone', 25(2) Fordham International Law Journal (2001) 391; S. Beresford
and A.S. Muller, 'The Special Court for Sierra Leone: An Initial Comment', 14(3) Leiden
Journal of International Law (2001) 635; A. Tejan-Cole, 'The Special Court for Sierra Leone:
Conceptual Concerns and Alternatives', I African Human Rights Law Journal (2001) 107; C.
Shocken, 'The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Overview and Recommendations', 20(2) Berkeley
Journal of International Law (2002) 436; J. Cerone, 'The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Estab-
lishing a New Approach to International Criminal Justice', 8(2) ILSA Journal of International
and Comparative Law (2002) 379; A. McDonald, 'Sierra Leone's Shoestring Special Court',
84(845) International Review of the Red Cross (2002) 121; M. Miraldi, 'Overcoming Obstacles
of Justice: The Special Court for Sierra Leone', 19(3) New York Law School Journal of Human
Rights (2003) 849 and A. Kanu and G. Tortora, 'The Legal Basis of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone', 3(1) Chinese Journal of International Law 515.
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examined the practice of the Court since it began operations in July 2003 to deter-
mine whether it is making any substantive contribution to international law.
This article aims to fill this gap in the literature by providing the first substan-
tive analysis of the contribution of the SCSL to the evolution of international law.
In this regard, the fundamental question that it will address is this: what, if any,
are the contributions of the SCSL to the development of international law? Of
particular interest will be whether the Court is making a jurisprudential addition
to international law, and if so, how and in what areas. While a final appraisal
of the SCSL's contribution must await the conclusion of its trials, including
any appeals, I submit that through its establishment and practice, the SCSL
has already made important institutional and jurisprudential contributions to the
development of international law.
The article is divided into three parts and a conclusion. Part I will provide a
brief overview of the circumstances in Sierra Leone which led to the establish-
ment of the Court. Part I will introduce the institutional innovations of the SCSL
vis-gi-vis the ICTY and ICTR that arguably constitute an important contribution
by the Court towards the institutional evolution of international criminal justice
institutions, and therefore, international law. Part III, which is the heart of this
article, will outline the areas in which the Court's case law is making a juris-
prudential addition to international law. Taking, as a case study, the controversy
regarding whether the SC has the power to setup an international criminal tribunal
under the Charter of the United Nations ('UN Charter') through a bilateral treaty
with a State, I suggest that the SCSL is already leaving a jurisprudential imprint
on international law. Part V of the article will assess two key challenges currently
facing the Court. In the Conclusion, I summarise my central arguments and assess
their broader implications for international law.
I. ORIGINS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR
SIERRA LEONE
A. Brief Overview of the Sierra Leonean Conflict
Sierra Leone was one of four British colonies in West Africa until it gained
political independence in April 1961. After what seemed an auspicious start for
democracy with the first transfer of power to an elected opposition party in an
independent African State in 1967,8 the country quickly degenerated into insta-
bility with a spate of military coups and counter-coups. 9 Ultimately, the civilian
All People's Congress ('APC') party formed a stable government around 1970.
Unfortunately, the APC government stifled democracy by transforming itself
into a despotic one-party regime and sustaining its strangle hold on the country
through massive corruption, nepotism, plunder of public assets and exacerbation
18 JR. Cartwright, Politics in Sierra Leone: 1947-1967, University of Toronto Press (1970) 4.
19 Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Report of the Commission 'Executive
Summary' Vol. 2, Chapter 1 <http://www.trcsierraleone.org/drwebsite/publish/v2cl.shtml>
accessed 10 November 2006.
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of ethnic and regional cleavages.2 ° By the 1990s, bad governance and economic
decay, among other factors, had created sufficient malaise for the outbreak of
conflict in the country.2'
In March 1991, an unidentified group of armed men attacked Bomaru in
eastern Sierra Leone near the Liberian border.22 The attack turned out to be the
first salvo of the Revolutionary United Front ('RUF') rebels apparently led by
one Foday Sankoh, a formerly low-ranking corporal in the Sierra Leone Army
('SLA'), whose ostensible goal was to overthrow the government of Joseph
Momoh. In a few weeks, the rebels, allegedly with logistical, financial and material
support from Charles Taylor of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia ('NPFL'), 23
quickly increased the intensity and frequency of their attacks. The ill-equipped
SLA, which had more experience putting down peaceful pro-democracy student
demonstrations than fighting a war, proved unable to contain the unrelenting and
devastating guerrilla attacks. In a few months, most of eastern Sierra Leone had
fallen under rebel control. The war soon spread to other parts of the country.
President Momoh lacked a coherent strategy to deal with the war and was
ousted from power in April 1992. Two successive military regimes failed to end
the war. Under pressure from Sierra Leoneans clamouring to participate in their
country's governance through the ballot box, democratic elections were finally
held in 1996. Sierra Leone People's Party candidate Ahmad Tejan Kabbah won
the elections. President Kabbah immediately entered into negotiations with the
RUF and concluded a peace accord in 1996. But the Abidjan Accord failed,
hostilities resumed and yet another military coup took place. Kabbah fled to
neighbouring Guinea.
With strong international backing, especially from the regional Economic
Community of West African States ('ECOWAS'), Kabbah was reinstated to power
in 1998. Around mid-1999, his government negotiated the Lomd Peace Agree-
ment with the RUF as a way of ending the conflict. However, even the amnesty
in Article IX (Pardon and Amnesty) granting Sankoh, and all other combatants
and collaborators, 'absolute and free pardon and reprieve' in respect of all their
actions between the start of the war and the conclusion of the Lomd Peace Agree-
ment proved insufficient to bring peace to Sierra Leone.24
B. Establishment of the Special Court
Around this time, the Sierra Leonean war had become notorious around the
world for its brutality and the commission of some of the worst humanitarian law
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Two recent works on the Sierra Leone war are L. Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF
and the Destruction of Sierra Leone, Indiana University Press (2006) and D. Keen, Conflict and
Collusion in Sierra Leone, Palgrave McMillan (2006).
23 Taylor started a guerrilla war in Liberia in 1989 similar to that led by Sankoh in Sierra Leone. He
served as Liberia's President from 1997 to 2003.
24 Peace Agreement Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front
18 May 1999 <http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html> accessed 20 November 2006.
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violations ever witnessed in a modem conflict. In June 2000, President Kabbah
declared that the RUF had violated the ceasefire and other key terms in the Lom6
Peace Agreement. Sankoh was arrested and held at an undisclosed location.
Consequently, under pressure from the human rights community to repudiate the
blanket amnesty and to establish some form of criminal accountability mecha-
nism, the Kabbah government asked the UN to assist it to create 'a credible court'
to try the worst offenders, 'especially the RUF leadership.' z5
President Kabbah's letter to the UNSG led the SC to adopt Resolution
1315(2000). The SC resolution authorised the UNSG to negotiate a bilateral
treaty between the UN and Sierra Leone for the establishment of a special court.
Importantly, the SC resolution authorised the creation of the Court; it did not
establish it. The signing of the UN-Sierra Leone Agreement and its annexed
statute negotiated by the UNSG with the Government of Sierra Leone marked the
formal establishment of the Court. Its terms received prior SC approval before it
was signed by the UNSG and Sierra Leone in January 2002.
II. INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE
Sierra Leone's request for UN assistance to create an independent tribunal to try
those responsible for alleged crimes during its decade-long civil war is remark-
able considering the near paralysis of States in prosecuting individuals for inter-
national crimes between the end of WW II and the creation of the ICTY and
ICTR. While partly motivated by the desire of the Kabbah government to credibly
prosecute its adversaries,2 6 with the SCSL in place alongside the other inter-
national criminal courts, it seems that international criminal justice is slowly
coming of age,27 and with it, the unprecedented extension of the horizontal and
vertical reach of international criminal and humanitarian law.
The ad hoc ICTY, ICTR and SCSL will characterise the international legal
landscape for the next few years.28 Though their trials are ongoing, it is already
clear that these institutions will leave an indelible mark on international law.
While the three tribunals are united by the objective of dispensing justice, the
SCSL differs in important respects from the ICTY and ICTR. Though largely
introduced to account for the peculiarities of the Sierra Leonean conflict, I submit
that these institutional innovations, which will be briefly examined next, add to
international law because they offer an alternative model, or at the very least an
additional prism, through which the international community can structure, or
view, future ad hoc criminal tribunals.
25 President Kabbah's letter to Kofi Annan, dated 12 June 2000, included a suggested framework for
the SCSL. See UN Doc. S12000786, annex.
26 See Schabas, UN International Tribunals, supra note 6 at 507.
27 For an authoritative assessment of this development in international law, see T. Meron, War
Crimes Law Come ofAge, Oxford University Press (1998).
28 The ICTY and ICTR are supposed to complete their work by 2010. See UN Doc. S/
RES/1534(2004). The SCSL also has a Completion Strategy. See UN Doc. A/59/816-S/2005/350
(27 May 2005). It is currently envisaged that all its trials will be completed around 2009-2010.
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The innovations of the SCSL model are particularly important because tribu-
nals like the ICTY/ICTR are, as Cassese has argued, 'no longer an option, as they
are too expensive, trials are too lengthy, and they will be superfluous because of
the setting up of the [ICC.' 2 9 While, as Cassese rightly observed, the prosecution
of modem atrocities will require different types of responses for different situa-
tions, in the long run:
... resorting to mixed or internationalised criminal courts and tribu-
nals may prove to be one of the most effective societal and institutional
devices of the many which are at present available to international
law-makers (emphasis added).3"
Indeed, nationalised international courts similar in nature to the SCSL will likely
become more common given the temporal and other jurisdictional limitations of
the ICC, the increasing requests for UN assistance to establish such tribunals (as
happened in respect of Burundi, and more recently, Lebanon), and the American
opposition to the ICC which gives it the tendency to support ad hoc tribunals as
an alternative to a permanent court. Given this backdrop, it makes sense for the
innovative features of the SCSL - which so far stands as one of the more credible
mixed courts"- to be replicated by the international community. Significantly,
various aspects of the SCSL model have been reproduced by the UN and Lebanon
in their recent draft agreement for a treaty-based Special Tribunal for Lebanon,
which is expected to prosecute those responsible for the February 2005 assassina-
tion of then Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 22 others.32
A. Contributions at the Founding of the Special Court
Six major institutional features can be identified from a study of the Court's
founding instruments. Each of these nuances the international criminal tribunal
model which is still in its infantile stage of development. Each will therefore be
examined in turn.
First, the SCSL, in contrast to the ICTY and ICTR, was established pursuant
to a bilateral treaty33 between the UN and Sierra Leone. This makes the Court
29 Cassese, supra note 15.
30 Ibid.
31 For example, compare the SCSL to the Serious Crimes Panels for East Timor whose trials were
marred with tremendous difficulties. See S. de Bertodano, East Timor: Trials and Tribulations in
Romano et. al (eds), supra note 15 at 79.
32 The SC adopted Resolution 1644 (14 December 2005) under Chapter VII. Para. 6 of the resolu-
tion asked the UNSG to assist Lebanon in identifying the character an international special
tribunal could take to try those responsible for the murder of Hariri: SC Res 1664 (29 March
2006) authorised the UNSG to negotiate the establishment of the special tribunal. See Report
of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1644, UN Doc S/2006/176 (21
March 2006) and Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a special tribunal
for Lebanon, UN Doc S/2006/893 (15 November 2006). See also Letter dated 21 November
2006from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc
S/2006/911 (24 November 2006).
33 The treaty-based nature of the SCSL is comparable to that of the ICC which is also based on a
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the first criminal tribunal to be created by a treaty between the UN and one of its
Member States. 34
By contrast, the ICTY and ICTR were created by the SC as subsidiary organs
of the UN under Chapter VI1 5 as measures intended to restore international peace
and security to the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda respectively under Articles
39,36 42"7 and 2938 of the UN Charter. While Chapter VII resolutions are coercive
in the sense of being binding on all UN Member States, the SCSL consensual
bilateral treaty approach offers a practical alternative to the use of such excep-
tional powers where the affected State is willing to prosecute serious interna-
tional law violations but is unable to do so for some reason, as in, for example,
Burundi 39 By serving as a functional model of such international criminal tribu-
nals, it offers an example that may assist the UN and the concerned State(s) to
structure such courts and to minimise institutional design flaws that may arise
from the creation of such tribunals. It also serves to highlight to willing States that
they could seize the initiative to drum support not otherwise forthcoming from
the international community to ensure that perpetrators of serious international
crimes will be prosecuted. This helps to shine a bright light signaling the end to
the dark decades of State inaction against impunity between the first prosecutions
at Nuremberg in 1945 and the creation of the ICTY in 1993.
Second, the SCSL has a mixed ratione materiae jurisdiction. This means that
the Prosecutor could invoke either or both international and Sierra Leonean law to
prosecute offenders. This aspect of the SCSL is one of its more legally significant
deviations from the ICTY/ICTR model. Indeed, while various national courts
have been 'internationalised' in Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor and Cambodia
thereby permitting them to assert jurisdiction over specific international crimes,
the SCSL was the first international criminal tribunal empowered to try a limited
group of those bearing 'greatest responsibility' for national offences alongside
treaty, albeit a multilateral one. Before these modem international criminal courts, the Nurem-
berg Tribunal was also set up via a multilateral treaty. A plan to establish a tribunal was incorpo-
rated into the Versailles Treaty but that tribunal never came to fruition.
34 The ICTY was established following the adoption of SC Res 808 (22 February 1993) UN Doc.
S/RES/808 and SC Res 827 (25 May 1993) UN Doc. S/RES/827. The ICTR was established by
SC Res 955 (8 November 1994) UN Doc. S/RES/955.
35 While the option of establishing the ICTY through a multilateral treaty was considered, it was
discarded for a number of pragmatic reasons.
36 The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
37 Article 42:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces
of Members of the United Nations.
38 It provides:
The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the
performance of its functions.
39 Based on a request from Burundi, the UN is currently negotiating the establishment of a special
tribunal for that country.
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offences under international law. Interestingly, the Prosecution's practice since
the Court's establishment has been not to invoke any of the Sierra Leonean crimes
in any of its 13 indictments issued publicly.
Given the shroud of secrecy surrounding the exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion, it is difficult to determine why the Prosecutor has not invoked any of the Sierra
Leonean offences in the SCSL Statute. It may be that the Prosecutor considered
the international crimes sufficient to cover the acts allegedly committed by those
that have so far been indicted. Yet, the parties establishing the SCSL (that is, the
UN and Sierra Leone) included two crimes relating to the abuse of underage girls
and the wanton destruction of property because they were convinced they would
be necessary to effectively address certain aspects of the Sierra Leonean conflict
which were apparently inadequately regulated at international law.n °
Whatever the case, it is regrettable that the Prosecution has not so far invoked
Sierra Leonean law as its use in indictments would have at least played a symbolic
role by signaling the restoration of the rule of law in the country thereby enhancing
the legitimacy of its troubled legal system. More importantly, it arguably would
have been more consistent with the intent of the parties who apparently wanted
to carve out a relatively more prominent role for Sierra Leone in the tribunal than
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia enjoyed in respect of the ICTR and ICTY.
Furthermore, the symbolism attaching to the use of Sierra Leonean law could
have enhanced Sierra Leoneans' sense of identification with and ownership of the
Court's processes.
While the Prosecutor's practice thus far has cast doubt on the utility of including
Sierra Leonean crimes in the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, I submit that this
innovation is still a useful contribution to the progress of international law. A
mixed subject matter jurisdiction advances the cause of individual accountability
for serious crimes by enabling prosecutions of crimes that may not otherwise be
punishable because they do not fit within the basket of recognised international
crimes, as was apparently the case in Sierra Leone.4 By creatively addressing a
perceived lacuna in international law using domestic law, this innovation tips the
scale a bit more in favour of international criminal courts by allowing them to
invoke national law in the same way that national courts have been able to invoke
international law to assert jurisdiction over fugitives whose punishment is in the
interest of the international community as a whole. This suggests that national
and international courts are now engaged in a two-way process whereby they
borrow from each other whenever necessary the aspects that advance the efficacy
of each of their respective regimes.
Third, and particularly significant, the SCSL is the first nationalised inter-
national criminal court to be located in the country where the crimes that are
being prosecuted took place. Establishing the Court in the locus criminis - the
place where the crimes were committed - contrasts favourably to the ICTY and
ICTR which have both been criticised because of their location in The Hague
40 UNSG Report on SCSL Establishment, supra note 6 at para. 19.
41 UNSG Report on SCSL Establishment, supra note 6 at para. 19.
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and Arusha respectively, far away from the communities in whose name they
are rendering justice. Indeed, today, it is settled that establishing an international
criminal court away from the affected country may limit or undermine its contri-
bution to post-conflict healing and reconciliation, as demonstrated by various
studies tracking popular attitudes towards the ICTR and ICTY in Rwanda and in
the former Yugoslavia respectively.
4 2
On the other hand, setting international criminal courts in the locus criminis
carries inherent risks because the wounds of war are so raw and memories
of atrocity so vivid that they could easily be reopened and manipulated by
disgruntled belligerents, potentially endangering witnesses and victims' families
(especially in circumstances where hostilities have not fully ceased at the time
of establishment of the tribunal).43 As Justice Geoffrey Robertson of the SCSL's
Appeals Chamber noted in the First Annual Report of the Court, 'a war crimes
court in a war torn country so soon after the war's end carries obvious risks,
especially for its personnel.'" Nevertheless, many would agree that locating an
international criminal court in situ has important advantages because it eases
prosecutorial investigations, facilitates the collection of evidence and the identi-
fication of witnesses, reduces the cost of prosecution and ultimately assists in
securing justice for the victims and their families who can witness their former
tormentors facing justice.45
Fourth, as subsidiary organs created by the SC, the ICTY and ICTR receive
funding from the regular UN budget borne in accordance with Article 17 of the
UN Charter. 6 By contrast, the SC decided to rely on donations by interested
States to fund the Court. 7 This mode of financing international justice initiatives
introduced for the first time by the UN and Sierra Leone was criticised by the
UNSG as 'neither viable nor sustainable' because of its unstable nature but his
proposal to instead use 'assessed contributions' was rejected.48 Regrettably, the
fundraising difficulties experienced by the SCSL even before it began operations
confirmed the UNSG's worst fears. 9
Ideally, funding for the global struggle against impunity would come out
of a separate global fund managed by the UN since it is clear that low-income
war-ravaged societies are least able to shoulder the burden of prosecutions in
the immediate aftermath of conflict as they seek to balance competing priorities
and scarce resources to literally reconstruct society physically, economically and
politically.5"
42 Report of the Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post
Conflict Societies, (2004) UN Doc. S/2004/616, para. 44.
43 R. Mani, Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War, Cambridge, Polity Press (2003).
44 Foreword to the First Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone
<http://scsl-server/sc-sl/new/specialcourtannuatreport2002-2003.pdf> accessed 22 November
2006.
45 Ibid. 38.
46 See ICTY Statute, Article 32; ICTR Statute, Article 30.
47 UN-SL Agreement, Article 6.
48 UNSG Report on the Establishment of the SCSL, para. 70.
49 Transitional Justice Report.
50 Mani, supra, note 43
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Despite its apparent weaknesses, this new mode of financing ad hoc tribunals
need not be written off outright because it may have the advantage of not extracting
much needed resources from an already cash-strapped UN. This is particularly
true for instances where funding is readily available to pay for a tribunal because
of the existence of the necessary political will on the part of donor governments
due to a convergence of their political, strategic or other interests, as appears to be
the case for Lebanon for which the SC is considering a tribunal of an international
character to prosecute those responsible for the February 2005 assassination of
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 22 others.5'
To the extent that the Court successfully road tests an alternative funding
mechanism that proves to be workable without compromising international fair
trial standards, and it cannot be emphasised enough that the jury is still out on
this until the Court's experience can be assessed following the completion of
its work, it would signal that establishing a global zero tolerance policy for top
violators of the laws of war need not necessarily be feared simply because of cost
considerations. At worst, the SCSL's experience with funding will offer a lesson
to the international community on how not to fund international criminal tribu-
nals, even where the focus is on having low budget special tribunals with no frills
trial procedures. By serving as a guinea pig for international criminal tribunals
whose primary budget relies on donations from interested States, the Court may
have opened up new vistas for the financing of international criminal courts that
could prove useful for the international community's assessments on how to fund
ad hoc international criminal courts in the future, especially where the question of
funding becomes the determinant of whether trials will take place or not.
The fifth institutional contribution that can be discerned from the Court's
founding instruments is that its non-judicial activities are managed by a group
of States sitting on its Management Committee.52 Established by Article 7 of
the UN-Sierra Leone Agreement, the Management Committee is comprised of
major donors to the Court mandated to 'provide advice and policy direction on
all non-judicial aspects' of the Court's work. While this kind of oversight mecha-
nism raises legitimate concerns in some quarters 3 regarding the independence
51 The SC adopted Resolution 1644 (14 December 2005) under its Chapter VII authority. Paragraph
6 of the resolution asked the UNSG to assist Lebanon in identifying the character an international
special tribunal could take to try those responsible for the murder of Hariri. SC Resolution 1664
(29 March 2006) authorised the UNSG to negotiate the establishment of the special tribunal.
See the Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1644, UN Doc
S/2006/176 (21 March 2006). Media reports indicate that western governments seem willing to
donate to such a court.
52 For more on this, see P. Mochochoko and G. Tortora, The Management Committee for the Special
Court for Sierra Leone in Romano et. al, Internationalized Criminal Courts, supra note 15 at
141-156.
53 See Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, SCSL-2004-14-AR-72-E (568-596), Preliminary Motion
Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Judicial Independence). Norman filed a motion challenging the
independence and fairness of the proceedings before the SCSL because of its funding arrange-
ment and the oversight of the Management Committee. The Appeals Chamber held 1) that the
funding arrangements were not such as to lead to bias in the Court's determination of the matters
before it and 2) that the Management Committee has no reason to seek to influence the outcome
of the cases before the SCSL.
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and accountability of a tribunal to third party States, especially regarding opera-
tional matters, it appears to help ensure that real-time resolution of operational
and funding difficulties are not encumbered or subjected to the bureaucratic and
political horse trading processes of the UN or the vagaries of General Assembly
politics.54
In any event, because the Court's major donors can track its work closely by
sitting on such a committee, it seems to encourage continuous engagement of
States with the anti-impunity campaign long after the media cameras are gone
and long after the crisis is struck from the top of the SC priority list. While it is
hard to substantiate this proposition based on the experience of the SCSL alone,
it appears that any continued international engagement with issues faced by
war-torn societies that otherwise subsist on the periphery of the world, whether
through such a committee or otherwise, should be welcomed as a way to increase
the chances that donors and the international community would maintain funding
and other forms of cooperation for such tribunals through to completion.
Sixth, and finally, the Sierra Leonean government, unlike those of Rwanda
and Yugoslavia, actively participated in the creation of SCSL, including in the
appointment of its judges55 and the deputy prosecutor56 (unlike the ICTY and
ICTR whose judges and Prosecutor are selected by the UN General Assembly and
the SC respectively).57 Strong host country involvement in making appointments
may enhance local participation at all levels in the work of criminal tribunals by
bringing to bear available local expertise, languages, history and nuances of a
particular conflict that could easily be missed by internationals. Where this leads
to the appointment of nationals, it enables them to generally serve as a bridge
between the tribunal and the community by bringing back stories to friends and
relatives about the legal process even as they learn about, and contribute to, the
application of international standards of justice. Indeed, in the context of the
SCSL, greater participation of Sierra Leoneans at more senior levels would likely
have boosted achievement of the Court's short-term and long-term objectives.
This is would be particularly so if Sierra Leonean lawyers that acquired experi-
ence in the prosecution of international crimes remained in the country after the
tribunal completed its work.
While the bulk of the foregoing institutional innovations in the founding
instruments of the Court were impelled by the need to address the specificities of
54 On the other hand, it could be argued that the politicking within the UN is simply replicated
within the smaller Management Committee with the bigger donors exercising inordinately more
influence.
55 Sierra Leone appoints 4 out of 11 of the Court's judges; only 2 of those 4 it appointed are Sierra
Leonean. See Article 2 (UN Sierra Leone Agreement) and 12 (SCSL Statute). Although one
would hope that the local government would not abuse this appointment power, keeping in mind
the need for the independence and impartiality of the judges. See Schabas, UN International
Criminal Tribunals, supra note 6 at 508.
56 To the dismay of many, the Kabbah government has not so far appointed a Sierra Leonean to the
Deputy Prosecutor position. Article 3 (UN Sierra Leone Agreement) and 15(4) (SCSL Statute).
57 ICTY Statute (Articles 13 bis and 13 ter; 16(4)); ICTR Statute (Articles 12 bis and 12 ter; Article
15(4)).
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the Sierra Leonean conflict, which also suggests that different factors will have to
be addressed when setting up ad hoc tribunals for other post-conflict situations in
the future, the solutions developed by the UN and Sierra Leone to tackle various
issues nevertheless introduced some new elements to the international criminal
justice equation that may collectively be said to constitute a useful addition to
international law. The lessons drawn from the SCSL experience will be particu-
larly valuable given the similarities between modern conflicts and the reality
that it is unlikely, as Cassese has argued, that the UN will establish international
criminal tribunals like the ICTY and ICTR in the future due to, among other
reasons, their enormous expense and the relatively slow pace of trials.58
B. Contributions from the Practice of the Special Court
Upon the start of its operations, various structures that were not envisaged in
the founding instruments of the SCSL were developed under the Court's Rules
of Procedure and Evidence ('RPE'). These institutional innovations came about
when the Court turned its mind to questions regarding how practically to provide
legal aid to the accused in order to ensure fair trials given the silence of the
SCSL's founding instruments on that issue, how to disseminate impartial and
accurate information about its work given that it is so far the only international
court in the locus criminis and how to leave a tangible legacy for Sierra Leone that
extends well beyond the prosecution of a small number of individuals 'bearing
greatest responsibility' to include nurturing the rule of law and the country's
impoverished justice sector.
The Court's answer to these operational challenges was to establish the Defence
Office under Rule 45 of the RPE,59 an Outreach Office60 under Rule 33(A) of the
RPE unprecedented in international criminal courts in respect of its scope and
depth, and the Legacy Phase Working Group, a first in international criminal
justice institutions, mandated with ensuring that the Court bequeaths a lasting
legacy to the people of Sierra Leone.61 In the next section, I briefly analyse each
of these innovations to illustrate the evolving practice of the SCSL that is making
a contribution to the maturing of international criminal justice institutions, and
thus, to the efficacy of international law.
58 Cassese, supra note 15 at 12.
59 Various authors have studied the Defence Office. The main articles are John R.W.D. Jones et.
al, 'The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Defence Perspective', 2(3) Journal of International
Criminal Justice (2004) 211; R. Skilbeck, 'Building the Fourth Pillar: Defence Rights at the
Special Court for Sierra Leone', 1(1) Essex Human Rights Review (2004) 66. A comparative
evaluation of the institutional structures of the Defence in ad hoc international criminal tribunals
can be found in Schabas, UN International Tribunals, supra note 16 at 613-618.
60 No major studies on the impact of the Outreach Programme have been published though this
author is aware of an internal study by the SCSL that has not yet been published.
61 V.0. Nmehielle and C.C. Jalloh, 'The Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone', 30(2)
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs (2006) 107 (highlighting the SCSL's unique notion of legacy
planning by international criminal tribunals and its possible contribution to the evolution of inter-
national criminal justice institutions).
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1. The Office of the Principal Defender: A 'Watershed' in International Criminal
Justice Administration?
Historically since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, international efforts to hold
liable individuals allegedly involved in the commission of serious international
crimes have recognised the importance of minimal fair trial rights for even those
that stand accused of the most serious crimes known to humanity. Aside from
holding fair trials to ensure that, as Justice Robert Jackson warned before the
Nuremberg trials, punishment is meted out only to the 'right persons for the right
reasons,' 62 anything less short of punishment without any hearings, condonation
of impunity or blanket executions would violate sacrosanct principles of modern
international human rights law and scar the conscience of decent people every-
where. 63
However, a trend that started at Nuremberg and Tokyo and that regrettably
continued with contemporary international criminal courts, including the ICTY,
ICTR, SCSL and most strikingly the permanent ICC,6 was a failure of the
creators of those tribunals to provide for even a rudimentary institutional frame-
work within the founding instruments of those courts outlining how practically
to ensure that their elaborate fair trial guarantees are realised by the accused.
In contrast, those same statutes would spell out in great detail the institutional
role of the other organs of such courts, notably Prosecution, Chambers and the
Registry.65
Part of the reason why the institutional apparatus to ensure the rights of the
accused has had stunted growth in international criminal law seems related to
sovereignty and the reality that States traditionally have primary jurisdiction to
enforce criminal law within their territories and over their nationals. Thus, efforts
to prosecute persons at the international level have had to be justified, legalised
and legitimated. In such an environment, the concerns about the defence of the
persons that the international tribunals would eventually prosecute have fallen
victim to the impetus for prosecution. This is particularly so given the accused's
tendency to capitalise on the apparent weaknesses of the fledgling international
criminal justice regime to attack not only the legality, but also the legitimacy of
the tribunal purporting to assert jurisdiction over them.
In fairness, the UN international tribunals have included some elaborate provi-
62 International Conference on Military Trials: Report to the President by Mr. Justice Jackson,
June 6, 1945 <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/jackson/jack08.htm> last accessed: 9
September 2006, para. 111:2.
63 UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev./Add. 11 (2001). Paragraph 11 of General Comment No.29, regarding
non-derogable rights, states: 'State parties may in no circumstances invoke article 4 of the
Covenant as justification for acting in violation of humanitarian law or peremptory norms of
international law, for instance by taking hostages, by imposing collective punishments, through
arbitrary deprivations of liberty or by deviatingfromfundamental principles offair trial, including
the presumption of innocence' (emphasis added).
64 A proposal to include an organ for the defence was apparently rejected.
65 Refreshingly, there now appears to be a break in the tradition in which the defence is treated as a
second class citizen at the altar of justice rendered by international criminal justice institutions.
This happened recently during the negotiation of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.
See supra note 32.
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sions promising fair trials for the accused. This in one way reflects the advances
in and impact of modern international human rights law on international criminal
law. Thus, Articles 20 and 21 of the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR respectively
guarantee fundamental fair trial rights for the accused, as do Articles 66 and 67
of the Rome Statute. Those provisions, inspired by Article 14 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights but reaching beyond it,66 are often supple-
mented by the procedural rules applicable before the tribunals and, taken individ-
ually or together, offer much more to the accused than did the basic Articles 16
and 9 of the Charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals respectively. Indeed,
the justice meted out following the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials offends our
modem human rights sensibility which has elevated due process rights, especially
the right to appeal, to the status ofjus cogens international law rules from which
no derogation is permitted. 67
Lacking the administrative infrastructure to practically ensure the rights
pledged to the accused, the practice in contemporary international criminal courts
has been for the Registry, the administrative organ of the tribunals that is supposed
to be neutrally servicing the Prosecution, Defence and Chambers, to provide
qualified and competent counsel as well as legal aid assistance for the often
indigent accused. Therefore, in the ICTY there is now an Office of Legal Aid
and Detention Matters and in the ICTR a Defence Counsel Management Section.
Those offices have come to play, under generally difficult conditions, a vital role
in ensuring that the defendants before those tribunals are represented by qualified
counsel. But those offices were set up well after the tribunals were established
and in a reactive damage control environment after a few unscrupulous defence
counsel had been found to engage in unethical conduct such as fee splitting with
clients as well as over billing, all at a high cost for the tribunals. Yet, the perils of
not having legal representation for accused persons colored the East Timor trials
where several accused did not have any counsel on the eve of their trials.68
In the SCSL, Article 17 of the Statute enshrines69 the fair trial rights of the
accused, including the right to a fair and public hearing, to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty, to be tried without undue delay, to adequate time and facili-
ties to prepare their defence, to counsel of their own choosing, and to examine, or
have examined, witnesses under the same conditions as witnesses against them.
However, as is the case with other international criminal tribunals, Article 17
and the rest of the SCSL Statute are mute on how the fair trial guarantees will be
realised by the accused or which of the three recognised organs are responsible
for ensuring them.
66 See Schabas, UN International Criminal Tribunals, supra note 16 at 503.
67 The 3 leaders of the victorious allies apparently flirted with the idea of having executions of
former Nazi leaders instead of war crimes trials. See A.J. Kochavi, Prelude to Nuremberg: Allied
War Crimes Policy and the Question of Punishment, University of North Carolina Press (1998).
68 Similarly, during the recent trial of Saddan Hussein, the credibility of the trials was further
undermined with the murder of three of Hussein's defence counsel.
69 The rights articulated in Article 17 of the Statute, Article 21 of the ICTY, 20 ICTR, and 66 and
67 of the Rome Statute are supplemented by those rights that the accused enjoy under general
conventional and customary international law, especially Article 14 of the ICCPR.
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Similarly, while Article 14 of the UN-Sierra Leone Agreement accorded to
counsel for suspects and accused immunity from personal arrest and from criminal/
civil process and the inviolability of all documents relating to the exercise of their
functions as counsel, the rest of the treaty did not provide a comparable organ to
that of the Prosecution, Chambers or Registry to uphold the rights of the accused
or provide modalities for the hiring of defence lawyers who play an indispensable
role in ensuring fair trials before the Court.
The judges of the SCSL sought to address the lacuna regarding the Defence
in the UN-Sierra Leone Agreement and the SCSL Statute by adopting Rule 45
of the RPE. In Rule 45(A), they directed the Registrar of the SCSL to 'develop,
establish and maintain' a Defence Office with the view 'to ensuring the rights of
suspects and accused persons' before the Court. The Defence Office, headed by a
Principal Defender, was to fulfill its important functions by providing, inter alia,
initial legal advice and assistance for accused by duty counsel situated reason-
ably close to the detention facility; legal assistance for indigent accused as may
be ordered by the judges in the interests of justice; and by providing adequate
support and facilities for counsel to defend the accused. The broad nature of Rule
45 meant that it later had to be supplemented by various other provisions as well
as directives developed by the Defence Office and or the Registry, for example,
the Directive on the Assignment of Counsel and the Indigence Guidelines.
The creation of the Defence Office with a mandate of ensuring the rights of
suspects and accused persons has been characterised by a leading scholar as one
of the 'more significant innovations in this area.'70 The establishment of a mixed
public defender's office that contracts private defence counsel to represent the
accused while working with its own in-house lawyers (duty counsel) to provide
backup support for counsel advanced an unprecedented approach to ensuring
greater equality of arms between the Prosecution and Defence in international
criminal justice administration.
The establishment of the Defence Office in the SCSL was partly motivated by
the judges' concern to preside over fair trials. But it was also hurriedly established
as a semi-autonomous unit within the Registry because of a fear of bad publicity
on the eve of the Prosecutor's release of his first indictments. Indeed, according
to Justice Robertson, the SCSL's first president, the Court could not afford to be
perceived as 'locking up penniless people before putting in place a system that
provides some form of legal aid for bail applications.'71 Importantly, as the SCSL
considered the various options regarding how to provide effective legal aid, the
Court's decision to establish a public defender's office was determined by the
overarching concern to reduce costs in the light of limited funding, the prohibitive
legal fees experienced in the defence of the accused at the ICTY and ICTR and
concerns about lawyer regulation against unethical conduct.
70 See Schabas, UNInternational Criminal Tribunals, supra note 16 at 615.
71 See Appendix to the separate and concurring opinion of Justice Robertson entitled Public
Defender Proposal in Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie
Borbor Kanu, SCSL-04-16-T-446, 14 December 2005 at pp. 17117-171121.
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However, the limitations of providing good legal aid on a shoestring budget
necessarily had to be balanced against the countervailing need for high quality and
competent defence counsel and the imperative of avoiding the obvious conflict of
interest that would result from the same public defenders simultaneously repre-
senting different accused.72 Taken together, these factors imposed limitations
on the ultimate choice of model for the defence that was adopted and deployed
by the SCSL. In the end, the office that was set up fell short of what its initial
supporters had envisaged introducing an ambiguity in Rule 45 that was to later
cause interpretational difficulties within the Court. These difficulties later pitted
the Defence Office against the Registrar in various motions filed before the Trial
Chambers. The power of the Registrar to supervise and oversee the operations of
the Defence Office was generally upheld in a number of decisions, some of which
clearly considered the role of the office in obiter and are therefore not binding.
Be that as it may, in the so far highly prosecution-oriented international
criminal justice system, the Defence Office which has been said to constitute 'a
watershed in the history of the Defence vis-ai-vis the rights of accused persons
in international Criminal tribunals'73 is a useful contribution to the maturing of
international criminal law, particularly if it ultimately is shown to have ensured
greater substantive equality and procedural balance between the Prosecution
and the Defence by the time the Court's trials are completed. Indeed, evidence
suggests that the SCSL's public defender model has already positively impacted
international criminal law because its existence and experience led to a proposal
that formed the basis for the establishment of a public defender style office in the
ICC and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.74
While the ICC did not replicate the public defender model developed in
the SCSL because of conflict of interest and cost considerations, it apparently
drew from the SCSL the basis of its current system under which it established a
separate office, the Office of Public Counsel for the Defence ('OPCD'), to repre-
sent and protect the rights of the accused.75 The OPCD is empowered to perform
various functions similar to those of the Defence Office, including representing
the accused during the initial stages of the investigation, and providing legal
research and advice for defence counsel. Lawyers from the OPCD would also
appear as counsel before the ICC on specific matters though permanent legal
representation of the accused would come from the roster of private counsel
similar to that maintained at the SCSL.
72 Ibid.
73 See V.0. Nmehielle, 'The Office of the Public Counsel for the Defence at the International
Criminal court: Sharing the Experience of the Office of the Principal Defender at the Special
Court four Sierra Leone', Presentation to the Seminar on Defence Counsel Issues at the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 31 May 2006 at 10 (presenter's copy, on file with the author).
74 Report to the Assembly of States Parties on Options for Ensuring Adequate Defence Counsel for
Accused Persons, 17 August 2004 ICC-ASP/3/16 <http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-
3-16-_defencecounselEnglish.pdf> last accessed: 9 September 2006.
75 Drawing on the Sierra Leone experience, the Cambodia Tribunal has also set up an Office of the
Public Defender with Rupert Skilbeck, the former Defence Advisor in the SCSL, as Principal
Defender. That office will not be examined here due to space constraints.
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But there are two important differences between the SCSL's Defence Office
and the model adopted by the ICC that deserve special mention. First, the OPCD
was not to be involved in the administrative and financial management of the
legal aid programme, a task that is performed by the Defence Support Section
in the ICC, a different unit within the Registry. Similarly, the OPCD was not
to be responsible for the provision of logistic/administrative support to defence
teams. At the SCSL, the Defence Office undertakes the work of both the OPCD
and DSS. Importantly, the combination of these two functions in a single office
in the SCSL is unique among international criminal justice institutions. Each of
the models, of course, has its benefits and drawbacks and it will be interesting
to evaluate the experience of the OPCD now that the ICC has the custody of an
accused (Thomas Lubanga).
The Defence Office in the SCSL has already served as a model for other inter-
national criminal tribunals to learn from, and to that extent, it arguably represents
a useful contribution to the evolution of the international criminal justice regime
as it matures to become a more balanced adversarial system that would give due
primacy to the presumption of innocence and the other fair trial protections for
the accused that are now essentially part of customary international human rights
law.
As with any 'innovation', the Defence Office, like international criminal courts
more generally, has had its own teething problems. In this vein, it may be useful
to identify and highlight a few of the lessons that can be distilled from the SCSL's
experience, some of which arise from the ambiguities contained in Rule 45.
First, the mandate of any public defender office in future criminal courts has
to be carefully crafted to avoid an inherently flawed conception. Ideally, the
office would be fully autonomous, including having a budget of its own, with
a status in the tribunal co-equal to that of the prosecution. One of the ways to
ensure this happens is to address the establishment of the defence early on in
the drafting of the court's founding instrument(s) so that defence concerns are
not addressed when everything else is already set. It is encouraging that this is
what the draft Statute of the Lebanon Tribunal has done. This marks a first in the
history of international criminal law. The SCSL's Defence Office presumably
influenced this development, including by unsuccessfully seeking autonomy from
the Registry. If this commitment is backed up in practice with adequate funding
for the Defence once the tribunal becomes operational, it will be one of the more
significant developments for international criminal justice that will likely be
studied for a long-time to come.
Secondly, the mandate given to the Defence Office in the SCSL was mixed
and inherently tense. On the one hand, the office is responsible for the legal
representation of the accused, at least up to and including the initial appearance.
In that role, duty counsel in the office would legitimately see the accused as their
client - a function that is then wholly transferred to private counsel assigned to
the accused who would then have full responsibility for the defence of that same
person. Greater clarity in Rule 45, which suggests that the Principal Defender
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has the power to continue representing the accused even after counsel have been
assigned, would have assisted in obviating the divergent interpretations of the
mandate of the Defence Office.
A third factor that muddies the waters even further is the reality that the
Defence Office in the SCSL was given responsibility for the assessment and
approval of defence counsel's legal bills, a function that in other international
criminal courts is left wholly to a different section of the Registry. The mandate
of the Defence Office in the SCSL to review, assess and approve the bills of
private counsel is consistent with its supervisory function to ensure that counsel,
as contractors, comply fully with the requisite administrative and financial regula-
tions of the Court. However, this may create tension between the support role and
the administrative supervisory role that the office has.
Generally, despite these teething problems, the Defence Office has helped
to elevate the fundamental rights of the accused in the SCSL, and by extension
international criminal justice administration, to a new level by offering itself as
a possible model for other international criminal courts (from the ICC to the
Cambodia and Lebanon tribunals), and to that extent, it represents a good contri-
bution to the development of international law. Only time will tell whether or
not this 'innovation' constitutes what the second Principal Defender of the Court
has posited amounts as constituting a 'watershed' in the history of the defence in
international criminal law.
2. The Legacy of the SCSL: Expanding the Reach of International Criminal
Courts?
Earlier, I noted that the location of the SCSL in the locus criminis offers an
unusual opportunity, hitherto unseen in contemporary international criminal
practice, for the Court to engage with and leave a lasting legacy for the people
and institutions of Sierra Leone and the international community. In this regard,
the SCSL is engaged in an unprecedented type of legacy planning largely because
of its location in the locus criminis, its mixed jurisdiction ratione materiae and
composition and the pressing needs of the Sierra Leonean legal system.
Recognising that it could add value for Sierra Leoneans well outside the
narrow confines of the courtroom, the Registry established in 2004 a Legacy
Phase Working Group comprised of personnel from various sections, and chaired
by a Legacy Coordinator, which has prepared a White Paper on Legacy and
devised various governance-related projects77 that the Court could implement so
as to leave a lasting imprint on the justice sector in Sierra Leone.
76 See Nmehielle and Jalloh, supra note 61. Because the argument on legacy that I make here is
developed more fully in that article, for space reasons, I only provide a brief synopsis of it here.
77 The projects are as follows: 1) Site Project (addressing the transfer of the Court's multi-million
11.5 acre compound to Sierra Leone); 2) Radio Justice (providing radio programming focusing
on disseminating court proceedings and information on rule of law and justice issues) and
3) Legal Resources Development Project (bequeathing of the Court's specialised library to
Sierra Leonean courts). A fourth project aimed at the establishment of an unprecedented Public
Defender System for Sierra Leone is under development by the Defence Office in consultation
with the Registry. Additional projects are being developed.
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As argued more fully elsewhere, the SCSL's apparent desire to plan and leave
a solid legacy in Sierra Leone is pragmatic, innovative, and consistent with
its mandate.7 8 Firstly, the tribunal seems aware that the 'The poor state of the
national judicial system, the serious erosion of the rule of law, and the lack of
accountability, all contributing factors to the decade-long conflict in Sierra Leone,
continue to plague the country.'7 9 The Court also recognises from the ongoing
trials in Freetown that the embers of war still burn and that a failure to carve
out its own role in fixing Sierra Leone's chronic problems of governance could
undermine its primary mandate of ensuring fair trials of the accused persons and
its broader objective of assisting to counter impunity. Indeed, ° the SCSL readily
acknowledges that in
operating in a context such as Sierra Leone, the prosecution of individ-
uals must be pursued along with other transitional justice strategies
in order to achieve the desired objectives: the restoration of the rule
of law and the development of the national legal system, which are
necessary conditions for the prevention of future conflict.8
Secondly, the Court is aware that Sierra Leoneans as well as the international
community have high and wide-ranging expectations of the role it can and ought
to play to influence positive reform of the Sierra Leonean legal system. 82 While
some of those expectations are so high as to be unrealistic,83 they must be read
in an overall context of the criticism put forth by some Sierra Leoneans that
the ongoing trials are expensive and that the funds expended on the tribunal so
far could have been better used to assist in rebuilding the shattered lives of the
victims, instead of focusing on the punishment of a few alleged perpetrators of
the war. This suggests that in the eyes of at least some Sierra Leoneans, the SCSL
will likely cement its place in the post-conflict dispensation if it is seen to have
played a meaningful role in strengthening the capacity of the country's troubled
judicial system.
Implementation of the most of the Court's ambitious legacy projects will
require significant time and money. If the SCSL succeeds in securing funding for
and successfully implementing them, its unprecedented approach to legacy will
likely serve as a viable model for existing or future international criminal tribu-
nals to employ in their respective theatres of operation and will thereby arguably
constitute an important contribution to international law.
78 That the Court was expected to play a role larger than simply prosecuting those deemed respon-
sible for the crimes committed in Sierra Leone is apparent from the report on the negotiations
between the UN and Sierra Leone leading to the creation of the tribunal. See UNSG on SCSL
Establishment (n 6) at para. 7.
79 Special Court Initial Legacy White Paper, as cited in Nmehielle and Jalloh, supra note 61.
80 See UN Doc. S/2004/616 (23 August 2004).
81 Initial Legacy White Paper (n 81) at 2.
82 International Center for Transitional Justice ('ICTJ'), The 'Legacy' of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, 29 September 2003, pp. 8 - 10. Available online at <http://www.ictj.org> accessed
28 November 2006.
83 Ibid. at 8.
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3. Bringing the Court to the People, and the People to the Court: The Outreach
Programme of the SCSL
The Outreach Programme in the SCSL is unique in being the only such programme
run by an international criminal court located in the locus criminis. This presents
practical challenges regarding how to present information, accurately and impar-
tially, about the trial process to a public bearing memories of recent conflict. The
Outreach Section was established by the Registrar in 2002 to link the work of
the Court to Sierra Leoneans. It also brings the views of Sierra Leoneans to the
Court.
The Outreach Section operates throughout Sierra Leone with an extensive
network of staff as well as through partnerships with various institutions and
other segments of society. Outreach targets the general public as well as specific
groups including the military, the police, students, the judiciary, religious leaders,
civil society and NGOs. Outreach employs both modem and traditional media
to broadcast the work of the Court, for example, through community town hall
meetings, radio programmes, publications, seminars and training.
Overall, the Outreach Section has played an important role in making Sierra
Leoneans aware of the work of the Court. Importantly, beyond Sierra Leone, its
work has served as a model offering useful lessons for other transitional justice
institutions in other countries emerging or newly emergent from conflict. Indeed,
growing recognition of the section's success has generated an interest in the
creation of outreach departments,84 from the ICC to Cambodia's Extraordinary
Chambers. As the bulk of international criminal justice institutions have so far
been situated away from the countries where the crimes that are being prosecuted
took place, it has offered the first real world experience from which important
lessons regarding how the international community and transitional justice insti-
tutions should plan to ensure the kind of dialogue that would assist in making
post-conflict societies transit more readily from trauma to peace. In this way, the
Outreach Section represents yet another institutional contribution of the SCSL to
the growth of international criminal law.
III. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE SPECIAL
COURT
A widely acknowledged impact of the ICTY and ICTR are their landmark contri-
butions to the development of international criminal jurisprudence. The rich body
of substantive and procedural law that has been bequeathed by those tribunals
has proven to be of immense benefit to the ongoing work of the SCSL, which
need not reinvent the wheel to ensure fair trials.8" However, the Court has started
84 Ibid.
85 The UN considered having a common appeals chamber for the SCSL and the ICTY and ICTR
with the view to ensuring a unified body of international criminal jurisprudence. That idea was
rejected for practical reasons. The compromise was a direction for the Court to use, mutatis
mutandis, the ICTR RPE (Article 14(1) SCSL Statute) and for the SCSL Appeals Chamber
decisions to be guided by the decisions rendered by those tribunals (Article 20(2)).
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making its own relatively modest contribution to the evolution of international
criminal jurisprudence.
In this regard, future legal efforts to hold violators to account will now benefit
from greater clarity on questions such as the nature and scope of the SC's
power to authorise an international tribunal and the legal nature, status and
consequence of such treaty-based courts; 86 whether sitting heads of States are
immune from prosecution for serious international crimes before mixed treaty-
based international courts; 87 whether amnesties granted under domestic law are
a bar to the prosecution of serious international crimes before an international
criminal court;8 whether alternative accountability mechanisms such as special
criminal tribunals and truth commissions can co-exist and complement each other
where used simultaneously, as was the case in Sierra Leone; 89 whether individual
criminal responsibility accrued to recruiters of child soldiers at customary inter-
national law by 30 November 1996;90 whether an incumbent head of State is
compellable as a witness before an international criminal court;91 and last but
not least, whether accused persons have a right to represent themselves or to be
present in proceedings before international criminal courts.9z
Moreover, whether or not one agrees with the reasoning of the judges, the case
law of the SCSL not only assisted it to resolve these complex issues in a way that
will permit it to dispense justice, it may also influence the growth of robust norms
on these matters by the broader international legal regime.
As it is not feasible to analyse all the abovementioned areas in which the Court
is leaving a jurisprudential mark on international law within the confines of this
article, I will focus on a seemingly innocuous but actually highly controversial
issue regarding the ability of the SC to authorise a criminal tribunal under a
86 The decisions on this issue are examined below.
87 Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Decision on Immunity from
Jurisdiction, 31st May 2004, 59.
88 Prosecutor v. Allieu Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Lack of Jurisdic-
tion /Abuse of Process: Amnesty Provided by the Lome Accord, 25th May 2004, 128.
89 Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT Decision on the Request by
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Sam
Hinga Norman, 29th October 2003,101. See also Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga Norman, Case No.
SCSL-2003-08-PT Decision on Appeal by the Truth And Reconciliation Commission for Sierra
Leone ('TRC' or 'The Commission') and Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP Against the Decision
of His Lordship, Mr. Justice Bankole Thompson Delivered on the 30th October 2003 to Deny the
TRC's Request to hold a Public Hearing with Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP, 28th November
2003, 122.
90 Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on Prelimi-
nary Motion on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), 31 st May 2004, 132.
91 Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana, Allieu Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-
14-T Decision on Motion by Moinina Fofana and Sam Hinga Norman for the Issuance of a
Subpoena Ad Testificandum to H.E. Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of the Republic
of Sierra Leone, 13th June 2006, 617. See also Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga Norman, Moinina
Fofana, Allieu Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T Decision on Interlocutory Appeals Against
Trial Chamber Decision Refusing to Subpoena the President of Sierra Leone, 11th September
2006, 688.
92 Prosecutor v. Samuel Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana, Allieu Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-
T Decision on the Application of Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation Under Article
17(4)(d) of the Statute of the Special Court, 8th June 2004, 125.
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resolution adopted outside Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the legal nature and
status of such a court. This jurisprudence is important because it not only impli-
cates the legality and the legitimacy of the Court, it also holds wider ramifications
for international law and the international community for at least two reasons.
First, the classic position of international law is that a treaty is only binding
on the parties creating it.03 Thus, if the UN establishes an international criminal
court by agreement with one of its Member States, as it did with Sierra Leone to
create the SCSL, that treaty is not binding on third States such as Liberia. This
means that such States, including their national courts, owe no obligation to assist
or cooperate with such an international criminal court (though, of course, they
are free to so do). The practical consequence of this is that such an international
tribunal will not have jurisdictional primacy over the courts of that third State,
nor will it have the power to compel the arrest and transfer of an accused residing
within that jurisdiction. The only exception to this general rule, which also pays
deference to the consensual nature of international law,94 is a situation whereby
the SC invokes its exceptional Chapter VII power to create an international
criminal tribunal. Such a decision becomes binding on all UN Members that must
then cooperate with the tribunal. This is what the SC did when it established the
ICTY and ICTR in 1993 and 1994 respectively.
The problem arises where the SC, instead of creating a tribunal, authorises
the creation of a tribunal through a bilateral treaty with a UN Member State,
and crucially, without invoking Chapter VII. What, in such a situation, will be
the legal nature of such a tribunal and its relationship, if any, with third States
to the bilateral treaty creating it? These, in a nutshell, are some of the contro-
versial questions that the SCSL had to confront in a number of preliminary
defence motions challenging the legality of its establishment. The answers that
it proffered, while at times muddied, assist our understanding of these important
issues, as will be demonstrated below.
Secondly, the Court's jurisprudence on its legal nature and status and the SC's
power to authorise an international criminal court may also be important because
it illuminates the doctrinal debate about whether a treaty-based international
tribunal can exercise a jurisdiction that the national courts of one of the parties
to the treaty (Sierra Leone) cannot exercise, for example, over Mr. Taylor who
was incumbent head of State of Liberia at the time of his indictment by the SCSL
Prosecutor in 2003.95
93 Generally, under international law, treaties do not create rights or obligations for third States,
except if those are expressly accepted. See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
Between States and International Organizations or Between International Organizations (adopted
21 March 1986, not yet in force) <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/1_2.htm> accessed 10
November 2006. This treaty is modeled on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which
is generally accepted as a codification of customary international law.
94 Even UN Member States would have agreed to accept and execute SC decisions addressing
threats to collective peace by their prior consent to the UN Charter as a whole.
95 Schabas, UN International Tribunals, supra note 16 at 56-60.
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A. Can the Security Council Establish or Authorise the Creation of Ad Hoc
International Criminal Courts?
Can the SC, the organ with primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security under the UN Charter, create an international criminal
court? If so, what are its options for doing so? Could it, for instance, set up an ad
hoc tribunal under Chapter VII as a non-forcible but binding measure on all UN
Member States or through a treaty authorised under Chapters VI or V? Although
the answer to these questions may appear self-evident today, before the establish-
ment of the ICTY, ICTR and the SCSL, the responses to those questions would
have tasked the imagination of many international lawyers and whatever answers
proffered would have remained highly contested.
The issue nevertheless remains important because concerns about the SC's
role and the scope and limits of its authority, if any, under the UN Charter are at
the forefront of debates about UN reform. 96 This is particularly so considering
the SC's broad enforcement powers, elite membership, expanded peacekeeping
and controversial world 'legislator'97 role in a globalised world dominated by a
sole and no longer as benign military superpower: the United States. Indeed, as
eloquently explained by Judge Sidhwa:
[firom decisions on questions well within its clear jurisdictional
limits, to those falling within permissible frontiers, the Council is
alleged to have broken its banks and intruded into uncharted territory,
originating controversy, undermining its respect and almost compel-
ling certain States to renege on their duty to accept its resolutions.98
Exacerbating the problem is the active role that the SC has assumed since the end
of the Cold War to formulate and enforce decisions with serious ramifications for
States and individuals as well as for the coherent development of international
law.99
1. The ICTY and ICTR Position
Against the above backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the first indictee before
the ICTY immediately challenged the legality of the SC's power to create that
tribunal. Dusko Tadic launched what the ICTY Appeals Chamber described as a
'three-pronged attack' on the tribunal, viz: 1) illegal foundation of the tribunal;
2) wrongful and unjustified primacy of the tribunal over national courts and 3)
96 Discussions about SC reform have been ongoing in the UN since the 1950s. In the past decade,
these discussions have intensified with numerous internal UN studies of the issue. No major
reform has so far taken place.
97 S. Talmon, The Security Council as World Legislature 99(1) American Journal of International
Law (2005) 175.
98 Tadic (IT-94-1-AR72) Separate Opinion of Judge Sidhwa on the Defence Motion for Interlocu-
tory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 20.
99 C. Jalloh, 'Immunity from Prosecution for International Crimes: The Case of Charles Taylor
at the Special Court for Sierra Leone', ASIL Insights <http:// http://www.asil.orglinsights
insigh145.htm> accessed 10 November 2006.
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lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 0 The defence advanced various arguments
that centered on the scope and limits of the SC's power to create an interna-
tional criminal court, arguing that Articles 41'0' and 42102 of Chapter VII of the
UN Charter did not expressly or impliedly authorise the SC to create a judicial
body, let alone an international criminal court. In the absence of such authority,
the defence contended, such a tribunal could only be created by treaty or by
amending the UN Charter.'0 3 The ICTY Appeals Chamber unanimously dismissed
the preliminary motion, and because the reasoning therein apparently influenced
the arguments of the defence and prosecution, and ultimately the decisions of the
SCSL's Appeal Chamber, it bears closer examination.
After preliminarily determining that it had inherent competence to examine
the legality of its own creation, the ICTY Appeals Chamber noted that the SC
is charged with the primary responsibility of ensuring international peace and
security under Article 24"° of the UN Charter, and that in the exercise of that
function, the SC is bound only by the limitations imposed by the purposes and
principles of the UN and the specific powers granted to it in Chapters VI,' °5 VII"°
and other sections of the UN Charter. As part of this, Article 3907 entrusted the
100 Tadic (ICTY-94-I-AR-72), Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Juris-
diction, 2 October 1995, para. 3.
101 Article 41 provides for SC action that is of a non-military nature, as can be seen from its text
which states:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are
to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the
United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption
of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
102 If non-military measures fail under Article 41, the text of Article 42 confirms that the SC could
use military force or other such heavy forms of sanction if it considers that necessary to restore
the peace. It provides:
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land
forces of Members of the United Nations.
103 Tadic, supra note 100 at para. 27.
104 It provides:
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer
on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security
Council acts on their behalf.
1. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security
Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.
2. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the
General Assembly for its consideration.
105 Pacific Settlement of Disputes.
106 Actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.
107 Article 39 states:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
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SC with the pivotal role of determining whether there is a 1) threat to the peace,
2) breach of the peace or 3) act of aggression affecting the collective security of
UN Member States."'5 The SC must also determine how to react to such situa-
tions, and in so doing, it can either make recommendations (that is, choose not
to use its exceptional Chapter VII powers by invoking Chapter VI instead) or 2)
invoke its extraordinary Chapter VII powers to adopt measures under Articles 41
(non-use of force) and 42 (use of force) in order to restore international peace and
security."°
The Appeals Chamber then considered whether the SC's possible response to
situations of collective insecurity was limited to the measures outlined in Articles
41 and 42 of the UN Charter, as Article 39 suggests, or whether it had broader
general powers to maintain or restore international peace. If it does, the Appeals
Chamber reasoned, then every measure decided by the SC under Chapter VII
need not necessarily be based on Articles 41, 42 or even 40. In other words, the
SC response to an Article 39 determination could be rooted in either Chapter VI
or VII. 110
In any event, according to the Appeals Chamber, the SC's power in Articles
41 and 42 endowed it with such wide discretion under both possibilities that it
was unnecessary to locate even greater powers in other parts of the UN Charter
to found its actions. While Articles 41 and 42 (Chapter VII) did not bestow the
establishment of a judicial body as an enforcement measure, the SC has authority,
and in the exercise of that authority enjoys a very wide - though not unlimited
discretion - to take whatever measure it deems appropriate to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
In relation to the former Yugoslavia, the SC had determined that the situa-
tion constituted a threat to international peace and security under Article 39,
and that the establishment of a criminal tribunal to try the worst perpetrators
would contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace in the region. On
this reasoning, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the SC's creation of the
ICTY rested on Article 41 as a non-forcible measure intended to help restore the
peace.
In the ICTR as well, various accused"' have launched a challenge similar to
that of Tadic to the legality of that tribunal's establishment. The ICTR Appeals
Chamber applied Tadic's reasoning to deny the motion. This should not be
108 Tadic, supra note 101 paras. 28-40.
109 The most robust of the SC's powers are in Chapter VII (Articles 39 to 51). The International
Court of Justice has also ruled that the binding force of SC resolutions is not limited to measures
taken pursuant to Chapter VII, see Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276
(1970) 1971 ICJ Rep 16 (Advisory Opinion of June 21). See also R. Higgins, 'The Advisory
Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions Are Binding Under Article 25 of the Charter?', 21
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1972) at 270.
110 For clarity, Chapter VI provides for the peaceful settlement of disputes while Chapter VII allows
for the imposition of coercive measures to address threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and
acts of aggression.
III Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi (ICTR-96-15-T), Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, 18
June 1997.
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surprising given that those two tribunals generally rely on the same substantive
law and procedural rules and share a common Appellate Chamber mandated with
ensuring, to the extent possible, a coherent body of jurisprudence." 2
2. The Treaty-Based Nature and Approach of the Special Court
In the SCSL, most of the accused filed preliminary motions challenging the
legality of the establishment of the Court. Perhaps encouraged by the UNSG's
characterisation of the SCSL as a 'treaty-based sui generis court of mixed juris-
diction and composition,'1 3 the defence focused on the unique aspects of the
Court to contest the SC's ability to authorise its creation. Many of them argued
that the SCSL is a national, not an international, court
In a number of inter-related decisions," 4 the Court's Appeals Chamber denied
all those preliminary motions ruling essentially that the SCSL is an international
criminal tribunal with an international mandate exercising jurisdiction over inter-
national crimes." 5 In so holding, the Appeals Chamber explained that the Court's
legal basis is the bilateral treaty concluded between the UN and Sierra Leone." 6
The treaty, which exists in the sphere of and is governed by international law,
clothed the tribunal with all the classic features of an international organisa-
tion, including an international legal personality independent from that of its
creators." 7 Conversely, the Court is not a Sierra Leonean court operating under
Sierra Leonean law.
While this reasoning would on one view be sufficient to demonstrate that the
SCSL is an international criminal court, the judges went further to clarify that its
treaty-basis meant it differed from the ICTY and ICTR, both of which were estab-
lished as subsidiary UN organs by the SC acting under Chapter VII. It reasoned
that while SC Resolution 1315 (2000) authorised the UNSG to negotiate the
establishment of the Court, the SC's power to so act:
was derived from the Charter of the United Nations both in regard
to the general purposes of the United Nations as expressed in Article
112 The Membership is the same. See Article 13(4) of the ICTR and 14(4) ICTY Statutes respec-
tively.
113 UNSG Report on SCSL Establishment, supra note 6 at para. 9.
114 Prosecutor v. Taylor (SCSL-2003-01-I), Decision on Immunity From Jurisdiction, 31 May
2005; Prosecutor v. Brima et. al (SCSL-03-06-PT), Ruling on the Application for the Issue of
a Writ of Habeas Corpus Filed by the Applicant, 22 July 2003; Prosecutor v. Fofana (SCSL-
2004-14-AR72 (E)), Decision on Preliminary Motion on Lack of Jurisdiction Materiae: Illegal
Delegation of Powers by the United Nations, 25 May 2004; Prosecutor v. Gbao (SCSL-2004-
15-AR72 (E)), Decision on the Invalidity of the Agreement Between the United Nations and
the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of the Special Court, 25 May 2004;
Prosecutor v. Kallon et al. (SCSL-2004-15/16/17-AR72(E)), Decision on Constitutionality and
Lack of Jurisdiction, 13 March 2004; Prosecutor v. Kallon et. al. (SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E)),
Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lomd Accord Amnesty, 13 March 2004; Kamara et al
(SCSL-04-16-AR72(E)), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lom Accord Amnesty, 13
March 2004 and Norman (SCSL-04-14-AR72(E)), Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on
Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), 31 May 2004.
115 Jalloh, 'Immunity from Prosecution', supra note 99.
116 Treaties between States and international organisations are governed by international law.
117 Kallon et al., Decision on Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction, paras. 44-52.
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1 of the Charter and the specific powers of the Security Council in
Articles 39 and 41.8
Indeed, those powers are sufficiently wide for the SC to authorise the forma-
tion of the Court by agreement with Sierra Leone. Under Article 39, the SC can
determine whether there is a threat to the peace, which it seemed to have done in
relation to Sierra Leone, by reiterating in Resolution 1315(2000) that the situation
in the country 'continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security
in the region."1 9 In addition, in executing its duties under Article 39, the SC acts
on behalf of all UN Members, and to that extent, the treaty entered into with
Sierra Leone to create the Court is 'an agreement with all members of the United
Nations and Sierra Leone.' Thus, a tribunal established in such circumstances is
'truly international.' 1
20
The debate about the SC's ability to authorise the creation of the SCSL has
been driven mainly by interest in the legal consequences flowing from that
status. 12' The Court has tried to definitively settle the controversy regarding
its nature and status, which arose largely because of its unprecedented mixed
mandate and structure. In so doing, it has reached the correct conclusion that it
is an international criminal court. But that conclusion has been undermined by
the methodology it adopted to elucidate its legal character and some of the weak
justifications offered to support it.
As the UNSG noted in his Report on the Establishment of the Court, the
legal nature of the SCSL, like that of any other legal entity, is determined by its
constitutive instrument. 122 The UNSG characterised the Court 'as a treaty-based
sui generis court of mixed jurisdiction and composition.' 23 He observed that the
Court is not a Sierra Leonean tribunal but that in its legal and technical aspects it
was close in nature to those of 'other international jurisdictions.' 124 The UNSG,
however, stopped short of calling the SCSL an international criminal court similar
in nature and stature to the ICTY and ICTR, perhaps because of the Court's Sierra
Leonean features.
This is where the problem began. While it would not have necessarily settled
the fierce debate that arose subsequently about the legal nature of the SCSL, it
would have perhaps been more helpful for a distinction to be drawn at that early
stage between the factors that are necessary in the determination of the legal status
of the Court and others less relevant to that determination, for example, its mixed
Sierra Leonean and international staff composition. Indeed, including nationals
in the staff of the SCSL does not mean that the Court functions in Sierra Leonean
law any more than its international staff would mean it functions in the sphere of
118 Taylor, Decision on Immunity From Jurisdiction, supra note 114 at para. 37.
119 Ibid at para 37.
120 With respect, for the reasons discussed later, this position is not tenable. Taylor, ibid. at para.
38.
121 These consequences will be discussed in more detail on pps. 41 to 45.
122 UNSG Report on SCSL Establishment, supra note 6 at para. 9.
123 Ibidat para. 9.
124 Ibid at para. 11.
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international law. Interestingly, aside from noting that the implementation of the
UN-Sierra Leone Agreement would require Sierra Leonean legislation 2 5 and that
the Court's concurrent jurisdiction and primacy extends only to Sierra Leonean
courts (not those of third States), the UNSG did not pursue the legal consequences
that would flow from the Court being the first treaty-based international criminal
tribunal established by the UN and one of its Member States.
Part of the difficulty in resolving the question regarding the Court's legal
nature arises from the reality that it exists in a legal scheme that provides for
the classification of criminal courts into binary categories of either 'national' or
'international.' International lawyers have tried to come to the rescue to address
what now appears to be the arbitrary categorization of courts as either 'national'
or 'international' by offering a third and seemingly more nuanced category of
'mixed,' 'hybrid' or 'second generation' courts.' 26 Hybrid courts are in turn said
to be either 'nationalised international tribunals' or 'internationalised domestic
courts.'
Unfortunately, inconsistencies in the use of this new language coupled with
the fact that some writers have attached legal significance to otherwise irrelevant
aspects to the determination of the legal nature of a tribunal have caused some
confusion in the literature. In this context, some, like Linton, classified the SCSL
as an 'internationalised domestic tribunal' along the lines of the Cambodia and
East Timor tribunals while Dickinson called it a 'hybrid court." 27 Others such as
Romano, et. al have rejected this language suggesting instead that 'the adjective
"internationalised" domestic bodies more adequately describes these bodies'
while other designations fail to do so; though, they conceded, 'internationalisa-
tion itself may be a matter of degree'.
But, as Nouwen has rightly observed, though such descriptions may accurately
describe the dual features of the Court, they do not capture its fundamentally
international legal nature."' Schabas, a leading commentator, offers the better
view that the SCSL 'is a close relative of the "hybrid tribunals" but not itself one
of those tribunals' since it is an international court created under international
law.'29 While I agree with him, I do not believe there is any harm in recognising
the Court's Sierra Leonean aspects by characterising it as a 'nationalised' inter-
national criminal court.
Be that as it may, besides the Appeals Chamber's correct conclusion that
the SCSL is an international criminal tribunal rooted in the UN-Sierra Leone
Agreement which exists in the realm of international law, a close reading of its
numerous decisions on its legal nature and status reveals that it has offered at
125 This in a way reaffirms the SCSL's international status because a country would not need to sign
a treaty to create a court under its domestic law.
126 On the various phrases used to describe the new courts and the merits or otherwise of the phrase-
ology adopted, see Romano et. al (eds), Preface, supra note 15 at ix.
127 S. Linton, 'Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice', 12(2)
Criminal Law Forum (2001) 185 at 231; Dickinson, supra note 10 at 299.
128 S.M. Nouwen, 'The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Immunity of Taylor: The Arrest
Warrant Case Continued', 18(3) Leiden Journal of International Law (2005) 645 at 651.
129 Schabas, UN International Tribunals, supra note 16 at 6.
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least two additional justifications for its finding that it is an international criminal
tribunal. With respect, as will be shown below, not all of the Appeals Chamber's
reasoning was persuasive.
First, building on Tadic, the Appeals Chamber suggested that the SC can estab-
lish a criminal court such as the SCSL under the general powers conferred on it
by the UN Charter. Here, the Appeals Chamber insinuated that while under the
UN Charter the SC does not have express authority to establish an international
criminal court, the SC's role as guardian of collective security outlined in Article
24 of the UN Charter could allow it to invoke the purposes of the UN in Article
1(1) to establish an international criminal court as part of the broad collective
measures that could be undertaken 3 ' to eliminate threats to the peace. Thus,
according to the Appeals Chamber, nothing prevents the SC from creating an
international criminal tribunal in 'a non-coercive way.' The Appeals Chamber did
not explain what it meant by 'non-coercive way,"'" but read in context, appears to
reference Chapters V and VI of the UN Charter which outline the Functions of the
SC and Pacific Settlement of Disputes respectively. This is in contrast to Chapter
VII which allows the SC to impose unilateral measures that are coercive in the
sense of imposing binding obligations on all UN Member States. Here, though
it did not cite those cases, the Appeals Chamber seems to be expanding upon a
point raised in Tadic32 and other international decisions that the SC has broader
general authority to maintain and restore international peace above and beyond
what is specifically provided for by Articles 41 and 42.'3
Secondly, as Schabas has noted, while accepting that its legal basis was
distinct from that of the ICTY and ICTR, the SCSL has claimed 'a somewhat
more indirect form of Security Council lineage'134 by suggesting that if Articles
39 and 41 of the UN Charter were sufficiently broad to permit the creation of
the ICTY and ICTR, they are also equally broad to authorise the SC to initiate
the establishment of the SCSL by adopting Resolution 1315(2000) (though the
resolution's language fell short of invoking Chapter VII). While Schabas did
not elaborate on this argument, it seems that the Appeals Chamber essentially
concluded that though the Court is a treaty-based international criminal court, the
general authority for its establishment, at least in relation to the UN's involve-
ment, is derived from the Chapter VII power of the SC. In this regard, two possi-
bilities can be discerned from a close analysis of the cases.
130 The Appeals Chamber did not state which organ could take such measures though its reference
is likely to the SC. It is hard to substantiate the claim that the SC, or for that matter other UN
organs, can rely on the general purposes of the organisation to derive specific powers to act.
Though, admittedly, the SC is in a different situation given its role in maintaining peace and the
overlap between that role with its functions in UN Charter Chapter V.
131 This statement may reflect an attempt to account for the suggestion in Tadic that the broad
powers of the SC under Chapter VII through Articles 41 and 42 are 'coercive vis-A-vis the culprit
State or entity'. See Tadic, supra note 100 at para. 31.
132 Ibid.
133 The most robust of the SC's powers are found in Chapter VII (Articles 39 to 51) of the UN
Charter.
134 Schabas, UN International Tribunals, supra note 16 at 55.
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The first and weaker argument is that the SC somehow intended to endow
the SCSL with full Chapter VII powers, much like it did for the ICTY and
ICTR. But this would leave unanswered the observation by various commenta-
tors that Resolution 1315(2000) departed from the SC practice of using specific
language denoting reliance on Chapter VII. 135 Indeed, aside from using pream-
bular language identical to the wording in Article 39 in various paragraphs of the
resolution, including '[r]eiterating that the situation in Sierra Leone continues to
constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,' the operative
part of the resolution hardly supports reading in an intent by the SC to adopt it
under Chapter VII or, more importantly, to impose binding obligations on third
States.136 This is particularly so given that a Chapter VII basis would transform
the Court into a UN subsidiary organ and financial responsibility, a burden that
Member States may resist. Furthermore, it is unlikely that Member States would
agree to such reasoning that the SCSL was meant to be a Chapter VII court in
view of the consequences entailed in such an outcome for them.
Though overlooked by the Appeals Chamber and commentators, it is arguable
that the SC did not need to use standard phrases such as 'acting under Chapter
VI' in the resolution authorising the establishment of the Court because, as early
as 8 October 1997, it had declared in an unequivocal Chapter VII resolution after
the May 1997 coup that the situation in Sierra Leone 'constituted a threat to inter-
national peace and security' (Resolution 1132(1997)). On this argument, all the
SC needed to confer Chapter VII authority on the SCSL would be to reiterate, as
it did in the preamble to Resolution 1315(2000), that the situation in the country
was a threat to international peace and security and that the establishment of the
SCSL would help to address that threat.
The second and more plausible reasoning is that by the time it adopted Resolu-
tion 1315(2000), the SC had decided it did not need to invoke Chapter VII to
authorise the creation of the SCSL. This would be so despite its earlier deter-
mination in Resolution 1132(1997) that the Sierra Leone situation constituted a
threat to international peace under Article 39 of the UN Charter. Accordingly, the
SC did not state in its usual language that it was 'acting under Chapter VII' in
Resolution 1315(2000) precisely because it did not intend to use that far-reaching
power. Rather, it merely reiterated 'that the situation in Sierra Leone continued to
constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region' before author-
ising the negotiations for the establishment of the Court. This begs the question:
what, under the UN Charter, could be the legal basis for the SC's decision?
The Appeals Chamber's decisions make it hard to give a definitive answer to
this question. On the one hand, the Appeals Chamber appears to suggest that the
SC saw the justification for its involvement in assisting Sierra Leone to establish
the Court as being based on the existence of an Article 39 'threat to the peace'
135 Z, Deen-Racsmany, 'Prosecutor v. Taylor: The status of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and
Its Implications for Immunity', 18(2) Leiden Journal of International Law (2003) 299, at 307
and 313; Schabas, UN International Tribunals, supra note 16 at 59.
136 Deen-Racsmany, ibid at 307.
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situation. It therefore accepted Sierra Leone's request for assistance to establish a
SCSL and requested the UNSG to facilitate its negotiation and creation. However,
the SC exercised the very wide margin of discretion to authorise the SCSL as a
non-forcible but binding measure under Article 41 of the UN Charter. Here, one
must note that the SCSL would be relying on the same ground invoked by the
Appeals Chamber in Tadic to justify the Chapter VII resolutions creating the
ICTY. If this is what the Appeals Chamber meant, with respect, its reasoning
appears too tortuous and circuitous to validate that conclusion. Among other
reasons, this conclusion would be contradicted by the language of Resolution
1315(2000), the UNSG's position that the Court does not have Chapter VII
powers, 137 the SCSL's admission that it did not posses such powers' 38 and the
writings of publicists.
39
On the other hand, the Appeals Chamber may be saying that after having
found the Sierra Leone situation at the time a threat to international peace under
Article 39, the SC chose to make a recommendation authorising the establish-
ment of the SCSL under its Chapter VI'4 ° power instead of continuing to operate
under Chapter VII thereby avoiding to invoke Article 41... or 42.142 This position
would be generally consistent with Tadic's interpretation of the SC's powers, is
bolstered by the language of Resolution 1315(2000) (which did not explicitly
invoke Chapter VII) and is consistent with the UNSG's reading of a lack of
Chapter VII authority in the Court and the Appeals Chamber's implied admission
of this to be so in its decisions.
Why then, a keen observer might ask, would the Appeals Chamber endorse a
disjunctive reading of Article 41? 143 It will be recalled that Article 41 allows, in
relevant part, the SC to:
decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to
be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the
Members of the [UN] to apply such measures.
Though the point is a nuanced one, a disjunctive reading of the first sentence
of Article 41 of the UN Charter would confirm that the SC is empowered to, first,
decide what measures not involving the use of armed force should be taken to
implement its decisions (which could be taken under Chapters V, VI or VII) and,
second, whether or not to call upon all UN Members to apply such measures with
137 UNSG Report on SCSL Establishment, supra note 6 at paras 10 and 51.
138 Justice Robertson wrote to the UNSG on I1 June 2003 seeking a SC resolution that would
endow the Court with Chapter VII authority. See Press Release 'Court President Requests
UN Security Council's Chapter Seven' (11 June 2003) <http://www.sc-sl.org/press-2003.html>
accessed 20 November 2006.
139 None of the authors cited in fn 25 has argued that the SCSL has Chapter VII powers.
140 Deen-Racsmany has argued that the SCSL is closer to consensual peacekeeping operation
commonly established under Chapter VI or between V1 and VII or, as a peaceful dispute settle-
ment mechanism under Article 36, Chapter VI. See supra note 138 at 308.
141 Again, this provision addresses non-military type measures.
142 This article allows the SC to determine whether all States or only some of them must carry out
the decisions it takes to maintain peace and security.
143 Taylor, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, supra note 115 at para. 38.
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the view to maintaining or restoring international peace and security (dissimilar
to the powers contained in Chapters V and VI but even more robust than its
powers under Chapter VII). On this view, the SC took the decision to create the
Court as a recommendation, which can also be based in Chapters V and VI, but
is confirmed as available to it by its even greater powers in Chapter VII and, in
particular, the second limb of the first sentence of Article 41.
Put differently, if we extrapolate from the Appeals Chamber's reasoning, it
is clear that the SC can take action to restore peace under Chapters V, VI or VII.
If it does, it may act alone to make a recommendation (Chapters V and VI), or
alternately, call on a State if consent exists (Chapter V and VI) or if it does not
(Chapter VII) all States or even other bodies (for example, the ICC) to assist it in
implementing the specific measure(s).'"
B. Implications of the Decisions by the Special Court Appeals Chamber
Read in context, the reasoning of the SCSL Appeals Chamber on the SC's power
to authorise the establishment of a criminal tribunal seems tied to the Court's
fundamental concern with determining its legal basis. As suggested earlier, it
betrays the Appeals Chamber concern about the legal consequences flowing from
the Court's bilateral treaty-basis for head of State immunity and the obligations of
third States - other controversies that were alive before it. This can be illustrated
by the complicated reasoning it adopted to bring itself as close as possible to the
SC's extraordinary Chapter VII umbrella.
Applying the logic derived from the preceding section, the SC could have
decided to authorise the SCSL as a measure intended to restore peace in Sierra
Leone and the region in Resolution 1315(2000). However, because it possessed
wide powers to establish such a tribunal as a recommendation (Chapter V or VI) or
obligation (Chapter VII), it chose to establish the Court, as the Appeals Chamber
put it, in a 'non-coercive way.' In other words, ultimately, the SC did not for its
own reasons impose the Court as a measure to be enforced by all UN Member
States as it did in respect of the ICTY and ICTR. This was because, according to
the Appeals Chamber, it could later impose such a Chapter VII obligation relating
to the SCSL on third States under Articles 41 and 48 'should subsequent events
make that course prudent.' 145 The latter in fact happened recently when the SC
adopted two Chapter VII resolutions calling for the arrest and transfer of Mr.
Taylor to the Court and to The Hague respectively."4 This bolsters the Appeals
Chamber's conclusion that its initial lack of a Chapter VII mandate does not
handicap the SCSL.
Nevertheless, the Court's attempt to navigate its way into Chapter VU was
unfortunate, and in any event, unnecessary to prove it was an international
144 Alternatively, as it often does, it could choose not to do anything.
145 Taylor, Decision on Immunity From Jurisdiction, supra note 101 at para. 38.
146 See UNSC Res 1638 (11 November 2005) UN Doc S/RES 1638 and UNSC Res 1688 (16 June
2006) UN Doc S/RES 1688.
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criminal court because it simply was a 'creature of international law, not domestic
law."47 Irrespective of the heading under which Resolution 1315(2000) falls, this
is not to deny that there is some significance'48 arising from the close involve-
ment of the SC in the creation of the SCSL, that major powers supported it and
continue to support it, including by donating funds and assisting in the manage-
ment of its operations.
While it is now safe to conclude that the resolution authorising the establish-
ment of the SCSL was not based on Chapter VII, a crucial point overlooked by
the Court and the literature is the reason why the SC may have decided to not use
its Chapter VII powers when setting up the SCSL. Yet, surely a relevant consid-
eration from the SC's perspective would be that it did not necessarily need to
invoke Chapter VII, which binds all UN Member States, to authorise the SCSL
as a measure to address a specific threat to international peace in Sierra Leone.
The Sierra Leonean government and a few other States apparently preferred and
lobbied for a Chapter VII mandate for the SCSL.149 While the SC hesitated to
use that power for financial and perhaps other reasons, based on Sierra Leone's
request for help to create an independent court, the SC could have understood the
scenario as one where most, if not all of the accused that would be tried by the
Court, would be from Sierra Leone for crimes largely committed against Sierra
Leoneans on Sierra Leonean soil. Indeed, President Kabbah's request was for a
court to try rebels, especially the RUF leadership, 'responsible for committing
crimes against the people of Sierra Leone and for the taking of United Nations
peacekeepers as hostages.""° The RUF leadership is said to have been largely
comprised of Sierra Leoneans though links were alleged to exist between them
and others from third States.
In any case, practically, it was more desirable for the SC to enter into an agree-
ment with the State (Sierra Leone) whose nationals would be most impacted by
the measure that it was deploying (the creation of a special court) and which
had not only consented to the application of that measure on its territory, it
had requested it. In addition, with few exceptions, most of the neighbouring
countries from which the future tribunal would likely have required cooperation,
for example to arrest and surrender an absconding indictee, had played a crucial
role in the Sierra Leone peace process. These include showing interest in the
negotiations regarding the establishment of the Court. Even before that, however,
many countries in the ECOWAS region (especially Nigeria and Guinea) had
invested heavily their political, economic and military resources to assist Sierra
Leone and neighbouring Liberia return to normalcy. Intimately aware of this, the
SC may have inferred that the future court would likely benefit from the coopera-
tion of other States in the region to facilitate its work. It therefore would not have
seen a need to invoke its unusual Chapter VII authority. With hindsight, such an
147 Schabas, UN International Tribunals, supra note 16 at 6.
148 Ibid at 59.
149 Mochochoko and Tortora, supra note 52 at 149.
150 Kabbah Letter to the UNSG, supra note 25 at 1.
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evaluation would have been generally accurate as most West African countries
and, indeed others much farther afield, have so far been supportive of the work
of the Court. 5'
Furthermore, those who see Chapter VII powers as an end, rather than the
means to an end, ignore the reality that whether or not an international criminal
tribunal is granted Chapter VII powers by the SC, the success of such entities
in achieving their mandates is more dependent on whether they can secure the
voluntary cooperation of States to facilitate their work. This is particularly true
given that States which fail to comply with Chapter VII orders from the SC will
not necessarily receive any meaningful sanction from the UN.152 The practical
experience of the Chapter VII powers endowed ICTY and ICTR shows that it
is important to use carrots, not just sticks, or at least a combination thereof, to
enable the work of such institutions whose work is often seen as an intrusion into
a traditional preserve of sovereignty.
Whatever the case, as Schabas has rightly concluded, the differences in the
legal nature of the ICTY and ICTR on the one hand and the SCSL, on the other,
are probably 'more theoretical than real" 53 in that they all rely on SC action to
ensure State compliance with their orders and requests for cooperation. Thus, as
noted above, the SC could always act by Chapter VII resolution to influence the
work of the SCSL, much as it does for the ICTY and ICTR. For this reason, and
ultimately, 'the concrete position of the Special Court does not necessarily seem
to be very different from that of the ICTY and ICTR.' 
5 4
To this one might add that given its years of experience with the other ad hoc
tribunals, the SC would be aware by the time the SCSL was established that it did
not have to use its exceptionally big stick (Chapter VII) to bind all UN Member
States, as it did for the ICTY and ICTR, because it could do so subsequently.
Moreover, it periodically even invokes Chapter VII to call on States to cooperate
with those tribunals. In any event, use of Chapter VII would have entailed finan-
cial consequences for the UN and the SC Members (especially the US) that
vocally supported the idea of a SCSL but did not wish to be saddled with paying
for it.
As noted earlier in this article, the implications of the SCSL's case law on our
appreciation of the powers of the SC may resonate in other areas of public inter-
national law. This could be significant because it may bear upon the obligations
that third States owe in respect of bilateral treaty-based tribunals in the future.
Certainly, because of the Court's bilateral legal basis, third States do not owe any
obligation to it. While they can cooperate with it, the Court does not share concur-
rent jurisdiction with them for the specific crimes contained in the SCSL Statute.
151 It is significant to observe that in the Lebanon context, perhaps because countries such as Syria
which are alleged to have been involved in the Hari Assassination have signaled that they will
not cooperate with a criminal tribunal, the UNSC passed a Chapter VII resolution to authorise
the creation of the court.
152 Schabas, UN International Tribunals, supra note 16 at 59.
153 Ibid. at 58.
154 Schabas, UN International Tribunals, supra note 16 at 59.
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It also lacks the primacy to ask them to transfer to it any national prosecutions
of individuals accused of the crimes within its jurisdiction. In this regard, it only
has that power in relation to Sierra Leone. For clarity, I am not suggesting here,
however, that the Court may not assert jurisdiction over the nationals of third
States under its statute for acts committed within Sierra Leone provided those
acts otherwise fall within its jurisdiction. In the result, it may be that the classic
treaty position on the obligations of third States is qualified in such situations by
the SC's creative use of both its coercive and non-coercive powers under the UN
Charter to address international criminality where its ripple effects could threaten
the collective peace.
But the more challenging issue in respect of the legal nature of the SCSL
which may have permeated its reasoning was whether it can assert a jurisdiction
that Sierra Leonean courts cannot exercise, as it did in respect of Mr. Taylor who
claimed immunity from indictment as incumbent President of Liberia. In fairness,
besides its unique treaty basis, the problem in the Appeals Chamber's reasoning
can be traced to the Court's adoption of the ICJ's widely criticised ruling on head
of State immunity.
In Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of I 1 April 2000 (Democratic Republic
of Congo v. Belgium),'55 the ICJ had found that certain international (but not
national) courts such as the ICTY, ICTR and ICC could prosecute an incum-
bent or previous senior government official. The authority of the two the ad hoc
tribunals to nullify the immunity of a sitting head of State would flow from their
establishment under Chapter VH of the UN Charter and the statutes of those
tribunals. The ICC's authority is based on the consent of the States Party to
the Rome Statute which abrogates such immunities. Neither established under
Chapter VII, nor consented to by third States to the UN-Sierra Leone Agreement
creating it, could the SCSL prosecute Liberia's Mr. Taylor? The SCSL Appeals
Chamber has ruled that it can, though that decision has received much criticism
in the literature. 56
Overall, without entering the fray on the nature and scope of head of State
immunity, whether or not one agrees with the Appeals Chamber's reasoning on
Mr. Taylor's immunity, the fact remains that the Court received the support of
Liberia and Nigeria and the UN for his trial to be made possible. While in a court
of law charged with holding fair trials and dispensing even handed justice the
notion that the ends justify the means has no place, the Chapter VII resolutions
155 Case concerning Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002 <http://www.icj-cij.org> accessed 10 November
2006. For commentary, see e.g. A. Cassese, 'When May Senior Officials Be Tried for Inter-
national Crimes? Some Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case', 13 European Journal of
International Law (2002) 853; S. Wirth, 'hImunity for Core Crimes? The ICJ's Judgment in
the Congo v. Belgium Case', (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 877; J. Wouters,
'The Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant Case: Some Critical
Remarks', 16 Leiden Journal of International Law (2003) 253.
156 For example, M. Frulli, 'The Question of Taylor's Immunity: Still in Search of a Balanced
Application of Personal Immunities?', 2(4) Journal of International Criminal Justice 1118;
Deen-Racsmany, supra note 136 and Nouwen, supra note 131.
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referred to earlier permitting the arrest and transfer of Mr. Taylor gives some SC
imprimatur to the Court's assertion of jurisdiction over him. It may be that the
earlier SC involvement in creating the Court is insufficient to permit the tribunal
to assert a personal jurisdiction that the national courts of Sierra Leone cannot
exercise. On the other hand, with the use of Chapter VII, the Court can arguably
displace the kind of immunities that Sierra Leonean courts cannot, because of
their status as national courts, displace. The controversy will likely continue for
years to come.
Ultimately, while an issue fiercely debated before the SCSL, the ICTY and
ICTR, it is now settled that the SC has authority to establish international criminal
tribunals - whether alone or through a treaty with one, and for that matter, more
States. This is especially so considering the generally unchallenged and promi-
nent role given to it to make referrals to the ICC or, in certain circumstances, to
block prosecutions under the Rome Statute.157 In the result, as Schabas surmised,
'the obstacles to the creation of future tribunals by the SC (and, indeed, referral of
cases to the International Criminal Court) are political, not judicial, in nature.' 58
That we can now conclude without extensive debate, less than a decade and a
half since the creation of the ICTY and ICTR, that the SC can create international
criminal tribunals is remarkable. While the ICTY and ICTR are the trailblazers
in this regard, the SCSL's unique experience as a treaty-based non-Chapter VII
court add much weight to the settlement of this norm in the jurisprudence and
practice of international law. Even if its reasoning is open to criticism in certain
respects, the SCSL's case law adds to our understanding of these important issues
by essentially positing two core principles.
First, that the SC can authorise or establish an international criminal court
using a resolution rooted in Chapters VI, VII, and possibly, even V of the UN
Charter.
Secondly, because State cooperation is critical to the success of such tribu-
nals, it is important to secure their consent when creating similar ad hoc criminal
courts, wherever possible, through conclusion of a treaty between the UN and
the State or group of States interested in the issue. Absent such cooperation,
such tribunals would have to be established under Chapter VII. It is notable that
contemporary SC practice bear out these conclusions.
Taken together, these principles represent a useful contribution by the SCSL
to the law and practice of the UN, especially considering the SC's enhanced role
in the maintenance of the collective peace in a highly interdependent but volatile
post-Cold War world.
157 Schabas, UN International Tribunals, supra note 16 at 59.
158 Schabas, UN International Tribunals, supra note 16 at 53. The SC referred the Darfur situa-
tion to the ICC in 2005. See UN Doc/S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005). For implications, cf L.
Condorelli, 'Comments on the Security Council Referral of the Situation in Darfur to the ICC',
(2005) 3(3) Journal of International Criminal Justice 590 and W.M. Reisman, 'On Paying the
Piper: Financial Responsibility for Security Council Referrals to the International Criminal
Court', 99(3) American Journal of International Law 615.
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IV. SOME CHALLENGES FACING THE SPECIAL COURT
But like any other institution, the SCSL has its own challenges. One must have
those challenges in mind to avoid blindness to its shortcomings. Since this article
aims to serve only as a preliminary assessment of the Court's institutional and
jurisprudential contributions to the growth of international law, it is appropriate to
highlight two challenges that the Court is facing at this stage of its lifespan. The
way they are dealt with now will be crucial to final assessments, in a few years, of
whether the SCSL has made a substantial contribution to international law.
A. Adequate Funding
The first relates to adequate funding for the Court through to completion. In Part II
of this article, I suggested that among the key innovative features of the SCSL was
its mode of financing through donations of UN Member States rather than from
the UN budget, as is the case for the ICTY and ICTR. It will be recalled that since
the Court is not a UN organ, it relies on funding from donor States to support its
work. While the UNSG opposed early on this proposed mode of financing of the
SCSL, the SC rejected his alternate proposal to fund the Court through 'assessed
contributions', perhaps because recourse to such funding would have essentially
transformed the treaty-based court into a UN organ. Despite its limitations, I have
here argued that this model for funding criminal courts need not be written off
outright because it may prove useful for funding other international tribunals in
situations where donor interests converge to provide the necessary political will
to assure stable funding. Yet, it is by now an open secret that the SCSL has faced
some funding difficulties to the point that it even had to seek a subvention grant
from the UN to address a potential shortfall.
To date, the Court has held a few donor pledging conferences with the assist-
ance of the Management Committee and the UNSG. Perhaps because of the
lukewarm response of States to its funding drive, the Court has also attempted
limited fund raising in the private sector with meetings between tribunal officials,
foundations and NGOs, especially for legacy projects. So far, those meetings
have not yielded more stable funding for its core operations, perhaps in part
because private donors believe that the SCSL, despite its current difficulties, will
likely continue to receive support from interested States and other members of the
international community. They also know that, at the worst, the Court's expenses
could be borne by the UN through subvention grants.
Voluntary contribution is, however, a two-edged sword. As submitted earlier,
if this mode of financing ad hoc criminal courts succeeds, it will stand as a model
of how to possibly fund tribunals in other post-conflict situations. This is impor-
tant given that the political will does not now exist to fund ICTY and ICTR style
courts. On the other hand, if donors fail the Court, it will provide a lesson on how
not to fund international criminal courts. Either way, the idea of running an inter-
national criminal court on a shoe string budget will have bequeathed an important
lesson for the international community.
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B. Ensuring Fair Trials Consistent with International Human Rights Law
The second major challenge for the Court has to do with its disposition of the
cases before it. In particular, the case of the three former members of the Civil
Defence Forces, a militia that is widely known to have been armed and supported
by the Sierra Leone government and to have played an important role in ending
the war, has raised questions among the people on whose behalf the Court is said
to be rendering justice. As part of this, the fate of Chief Samuel Hinga Norman,
who was indicted on 7 March 2003 for war crimes, crimes against humanity
and other serious violations of international humanitarian law, has been a source
of debate among the Sierra Leonean body politic and will likely remain so for
years.
The second concern in respect of specific cases has to do with the trial of
former President Charles Taylor of Liberia. Mr. Taylor, who was arrested at the
end of March 2006, was indicted on 11159 counts of crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. In the
Amended Indictment, the Prosecutor invoked theories of command responsibility
and joint criminal enterprise to allege that Mr. Taylor planned, ordered or insti-
gated the commission of those crimes within Sierra Leone contrary to the SCSL
Statute, and that as NPFL leader, he worked in concert with and supported the
RUF, and ought therefore, to be held liable.
On 29 March 2006, a day after Mr. Taylor's transfer to the Court, Justice Raja
N. Fernando (Sri Lanka), the President of the SCSL at the time, 6 ' citing concerns
about security, requested the assistance of the Government of the Netherlands
and the President of the ICC to facilitate the Court's trial of Mr. Taylor in The
Hague. 6' The Dutch Government agreed to host the trial, provided a UNSC
resolution formalised the request and a third country agrees to receive Mr. Taylor
after his trial, whether found innocent or guilty. Defence Counsel for Mr. Taylor
filed an urgent motion before Trial Chamber 1I162 challenging the possible change
of venue of the trial emphasising, in particular, his client's right to be heard
whether the case should be transferred.
163
159 He was previously indicted on 17 counts.
160 Justice King was elected President of the Special Court at the Plenary held between May 12 and
14, 2006 in Freetown. See Special Court for Sierra Leone, Press Release dated 15 May 2006,
'New President for the Special Court for Sierra Leone', online: <http://www.sc-sl.org/Press/
pressrelease-051506.pdf> last accessed 31 May 2006.
161 For an analysis of the intersection of international law and international politics in the Taylor
case, see Charles Jalloh, The Law and Politics of the Charles Taylor Case, Canadian Council
on International Law Web Exclusive (April 2006), online: <http://www.ccil-ccdi.ca/index.
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=165&Itemid=76> accessed 13 November 2006.
162 Trial Chamber It is composed of Justices Richard Lussick (Samoa), Presiding; Julia Sebutinde
(Uganda); and Teresa Doherty (Northern Ireland). The Government of Sierra Leone nominated
the former while the UNSG appointed the latter two.
163 See Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, SCSL. SCSL-03-01-PT-91, Urgent Defence Motion
for an Order that no Change of Venue from the Seat of the Court in Freetown be Ordered without
the Defence Being Heard on the Issue and Motion that the Trial Chamber Request the President
of the Special Court to Withdraw the Requests Reportedly Made to (1) The Government of the
Kingdom of the Netherlands to Permit that the Trial of Charles Ghankay Taylor be Conducted
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The motion was referred to the Appeals Chamber under the RPE. The Appeals
Chamber found the Trial Chamber's referral improper because 1) the motion had
nothing to do with jurisdiction or abuse of process and 2) the motion sought relief
that the Trial Chamber was not authorised to grant. While the Appeals Chamber
could have refused to examine the merits of the motion because of the improper
referral, it decided to do so and concluded that the motion was inadmissible
because it would amount to judicial interference with the 'administrative and
diplomatic functions ' of the President, which neither Chamber was authorised
to do under the relevant instruments of the SCSL.
In Resolution 1688(2006) passed on 16 June 2006 under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter, the UNSC concluded that, Mr. Taylor's trial should be transferred
to The Hague because his continued presence in West Africa is an impediment
to the peace of Liberia and Sierra Leone, and a threat to international peace and
security in the region. By an order of the President of the Court, Mr. Taylor was
later transferred to The Hague.
The decision to transfer the Taylor case outside Sierra Leone has proven to
be highly controversial, including with the accused who opposed it. On the one
hand, many rights advocates believed that moving the trial away from the country
would deny Sierra Leoneans an opportunity to witness the trial thereby rendering
nugatory a core advantage of the Court over existing international criminal tribu-
nals: its siting in the locus criminis.65 Others challenged the security rationale for
moving the trial suggesting that better security could instead have been provided
for the SCSL and the country instead of moving the trial. Concerns were also
raised about the legal and procedural difficulties inherent in holding the trial
in The Hague with witnesses coming from as far away as West Africa, and the
negative implications of the perception that the justice process is far removed
from the West Africans who most need to see it done. On the other hand, senior
SCSL officials have emphasised that the security concerns are paramount in the
light of the youth of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean peace and are therefore
sufficient reason to move the trial.
Regardless of the merits, the debate about the change of venue for the Taylor
trial is now moot as even a defence motion to return the case to Freetown was
denied by the Court. Practically, one of the key issues for the Court will be gener-
ating the funds that will be required to address the increased costs associated with
having a miniature version of the Court sit in The Hague for as long as neces-
sary to conduct the trial fairly and expeditiously. The provision of office space
and salaries for a skeletal staff will be part of the concern; however, such costs
will pale in comparison to the funds that will be required to address the logistics
involved with holding the Court's largest and most high profile trial thousands of
miles away from Sierra Leone and West Africa.
on its Territory and (2) to the President of the ICC for use of the ICC Building and Facilities in
the Netherlands during the Proposed Trial of Charles Ghankay Taylor, especially paras. 2-3.
164 Appeals Chamber Decision at para. 5.
165 For more on this, see The Law and Politics of the Charles Taylor Case, supra note 162.
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A fundamental concern, with far reaching implications, will be whether the
Court provides adequate funding for the legal defence of Mr. Taylor so as to
ensure he will have a trial that is not only actually fair from the perspective of the
Court, but also seen as fair by the accused, the people of Africa and the rest of
the world. This latter aspect will be critical given that various Defence motions
seeking adequate resources and more time to prepare for the case were dismissed
by the Trial Chamber. In the end, as Justice Robertson of the Appeals Chamber
underscored early on in the life of the Court, the success of the SCSL will not
be measured by its rate of convictions 'but by whether, at the end of the day, it
can be said to have dealt fairly with every accused before it in a process that
remains utterly independent from outside influence, whether from Governments
or business or the media.166
CONCLUSION
This article sought to answer the fundamental question whether the SCSL has
made any substantive contribution to the development of international law. While
it has not yet completed its work, I argued that through its establishment and
practice the SCSL is already making an important contribution to the evolution of
international law in at least two ways.
Firstly, I contended that the Court has introduced institutional innovations
that could prove useful to the international community when establishing future
ad hoc tribunals. As part of my analysis, I compared the Court generally with
the ICTY and ICTR and introduced a distinction to the literature between those
innovations that can be discerned primarily from a study of its constitutive instru-
ments and those arising from its practice. In this regard, I highlighted the Court's
bilateral treaty-basis, mixed jurisdiction ratione materiae, siting in the locus
criminis, operational oversight through a Management Committee, funding by
voluntary contributions and the Sierra Leonean government involvement in the
appointment of its senior officials as potentially useful novelties that assist in the
maturing of international criminal justice institutions.
Regarding the practice of the Court after its establishment, I maintained that
the Court's culture of innovation continued with its creation of an innovative
Defence Office, an Outreach Programme unprecedented in depth and scope and
a distinctive approach to legacy planning among international tribunals that, if
successful, will leave a lasting imprint on the Sierra Leonean and international
legal regimes. Some of its institutional innovations, for example the Defence
Office, have already informed the ICC's public counsel model and may prove
useful for similar ad hoc tribunals that may be established in the future.
Secondly, I posited that the SCSL has also begun to make a modest contribution
to international law through its addition to the formidable body of international
166 Address by SCSL President Geoffrey Robertson at the formal opening of the Courthouse for the
SCSL (10 March 2004) < http://www.sc-sl.org/robertson03l04.htnl> accessed 25 November
2006.
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criminal jurisprudence developed by the ICTY and ICTR. More specifically, I
suggested that the evolving jurisprudence of the Court in a number of unsettled
areas of international law may have broken new ground and therefore represents
a useful contribution to the clarity of international law. Of course, greater clarity
in the law is particularly important in international criminal justice which impli-
cates the fundamental liberty interests of persons that stand accused of some of
the most serious crimes known to humanity.
For space reasons, I could not pursue the significance for international law
of the Court's case law in the six areas in which I suggested its jurispruden-
tial impact will be felt. However, I illustrated its contribution by examining its
decisions regarding the SC's power to authorise the creation of a treaty-based
criminal tribunal and the follow on question about the legal nature and status
of such a Court. Through an exegesis of the relevant decisions and literature, I
demonstrated that while the SCSL Appeals Chamber reached the correct conclu-
sion that it is an international criminal court, its attempt to fit the Court within
Chapter VII of the UN Charter was unnecessary. I also showed that some of the
justifications advanced to prove the Court's international legal status were unper-
suasive. Given the importance and uniqueness of the SCSL mandate, it is crucial
that the reasoning in future decisions can withstand scrutiny. Only in that way
will the Court ensure it realises the full potential of its jurisprudential legacy to
international law.
On the specific issue of the SC's power, a key lesson gleaned from the juris-
prudence is that where State consent exists and an ad hoc tribunal is necessary, it
should be established by treaty rather than by SC resolution. Where the tribunal
must be authorised or established by the SC, it should ideally be based on Chapter
VII to avoid doubts regarding its powers and controversy regarding its assertions
of personal jurisdiction.
Having highlighted what I contend are the main institutional and jurispru-
dential contributions of the SCSL to the development of international law, it is
noteworthy that the Court's experience has already figured prominently in UN
negotiations regarding the establishment of mixed international criminal courts
for countries such as Burundi, and more recently, Lebanon. In this regard, it is
telling that many of the institutional innovations of the Court, such as the Defence
Office, have been included in the envisaged Statute of the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon. This marks a significant step for the Defence in international criminal
law. It is also a symbolic victory for those who toil daily to ensure that, in addition
to the victims, human rights keeps its promise to those accused of serious inter-
national crimes.
In the final analysis, however, it would be premature to proclaim the ultimate
success of the Court given that its trials are not yet complete. Nevertheless, to the
extent that it successfully road tests the nationalised international court model
thereby proving that it is workable without compromising international fair trial
standards, it would have left a lasting legacy to Sierra Leone, international law
and the international community. Ultimately, it is befitting that the impact of the
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SCSL be felt outside Sierra Leone, and that it contribute in whatever way it can,
to the larger projects of 'international law' and 'international community' since,
as President Kabbah suggested at the opening ceremony of its courthouse in
Freetown in March 2004, the Court is not only a 'symbol of rule of law and an
essential element in the pursuit of peace, justice and national reconciliation for
the people of Sierra Leone,' 167 it:
is also a Special Court for the international community, a symbol of
the rule of international law, especially at a time when some State and
non-State actors are increasingly displaying, shamelessly, contempt
for the principles of international law, including international human-
itarian law and human rights law. This Special Court is good for
Sierra Leone. It is also good for the world today. 168
167 Statement by His Excellency Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of the Republic of
Sierra Leone at the formal opening of the Courthouse for the SCSL (10 March 2004) < http://
www.sc-sl.org/kabbah03lOO4.html> accessed 25 November 2006, para. 10. Note that the SCSL
occupied temporary premises until the completion of its modem courthouse 2 years after its
establishment.
168 Ibid.
